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THE ALGORITHMIC DIVIDE AND EQUALITY IN THE AGE OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Peter K. Yu* 
Abstract 
In the age of artificial intelligence, highly sophisticated algorithms 
have been deployed to provide analysis, detect patterns, optimize 
solutions, accelerate operations, facilitate self-learning, minimize human 
errors and biases, and foster improvements in technological products and 
services. Notwithstanding these tremendous benefits, algorithms and 
intelligent machines do not provide equal benefits to all. Just as the 
“digital divide” has separated those with access to the Internet, 
information technology, and digital content from those without, an 
emerging and ever-widening “algorithmic divide” now threatens to take 
away the many political, social, economic, cultural, educational, and 
career opportunities provided by machine learning and artificial 
intelligence. Although policy makers, commentators, and the mass media 
have paid growing attention to algorithmic bias and the shortcomings of 
machine learning and artificial intelligence, the algorithmic divide has yet 
to attract much policy and scholarly attention. To fill the lacuna, this 
Article draws on the digital divide literature to systematically analyze this 
new inequitable gap between the technology haves and have-nots. 
Utilizing an analytical framework that the Author developed in the early 
2000s, the Article discusses the five attributes of the algorithmic divide: 
awareness, access, affordability, availability, and adaptability. This 
Article then turns to three major problems precipitated by an emerging 
and fast-expanding algorithmic divide: algorithmic deprivation, 
algorithmic discrimination, and algorithmic distortion. This Article 
concludes by proposing seven non-exhaustive clusters of remedial 
actions to help bridge this emerging and ever-widening divide. 
Combining law, communications policy, ethical principles, institutional 
mechanisms, and business practices, the Article fashions a holistic 
response to foster equality in the age of artificial intelligence. 
 
 * Copyright © 2020 Peter K. Yu. Professor of Law, Professor of Communication, and 
Director, Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University. Earlier versions of 
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International Law Weekend 2019 at Fordham University School of Law, the Third Annual IP 
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Intellectual Property Student Association at Florida International University College of Law, the 
Third Annual Scholarship Retreat at Texas A&M University School of Law, and the Faculty 
Workshop at the University of Kansas School of Law. I am grateful to Anne Cheung, Daryl Lim, 
Lumen Mulligan, Janewa Osei-Tutu, Uma Outka, and Sun Haochen for their kind invitations and 
the event participants for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the age of artificial intelligence (AI), highly sophisticated 
algorithms1 have been deployed to provide analysis, detect patterns, 
optimize solutions, accelerate operations, facilitate self-learning, 
minimize human errors and biases, and foster improvements in 
 
 1. As the U.S. Public Policy Council of the Association for Computing Machinery 
explained: 
An algorithm is a self-contained step-by-step set of operations that 
computers and other “smart” devices carry out to perform calculation, data 
processing, and automated reasoning tasks. Increasingly, algorithms implement 
institutional decision-making based on analytics, which involves the discovery, 
interpretation, and communication of meaningful patterns in data. Especially 
valuable in areas rich with recorded information, analytics relies on the 
simultaneous application of statistics, computer programming, and operations 
research to quantify performance. 
ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACH. U.S. PUB. POLICY COUNCIL, STATEMENT ON ALGORITHMIC 
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technological products and services.2 As Pedro Domingos observed in the 
opening of his best-selling book, The Master Algorithm: 
You may not know it, but machine learning is all around 
you. When you type a query into a search engine, it’s how 
the engine figures out which results to show you (and which 
ads, as well). When you read your e-mail, you don’t see most 
of the spam, because machine learning filtered it out. Go to 
Amazon.com to buy a book or Netflix to watch a video, and 
a machine-learning system helpfully recommends some you 
might like. Facebook uses machine learning to decide which 
updates to show you, and Twitter does the same for tweets. 
Whenever you use a computer, chances are machine learning 
is involved somewhere.3 
Indeed, without the enhancements that algorithms provide, machines will 
not be able to acquire the “intelligence” needed to effectively function in 
today’s fast-evolving technological environment.4 
Despite the tremendous promise of machine learning and artificial 
intelligence, algorithms and intelligent machines do not provide equal 
 
 2. See id. (“Computer algorithms are [now] widely employed throughout our economy 
and society to make decisions that have far-reaching impacts, including their applications for 
education, access to credit, healthcare, and employment.”); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING 
INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 9 (2017) (“Digital 
tracking and decision-making systems have become routine in policing, political forecasting, 
marketing, credit reporting, criminal sentencing, business management, finance, and the 
administration of public programs.”); NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN 3 (2016), https://www.nitrd. 
gov/pubs/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N4S-VHW4] (“Artificial 
intelligence . . . is a transformative technology that holds promise for tremendous societal and 
economic benefit. AI has the potential to revolutionize how we live, work, learn, discover, and 
communicate.”); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 
UCLA L. REV. 54, 56 (2019) (“Today, algorithms determine the optimal way to produce and ship 
goods, the prices we pay for those goods, the money we can borrow, the people who teach our 
children, and the books and articles we read—reducing each activity to an actuarial risk or 
score.”). See generally Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA 
TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167 (Tarleton 
Gillespie et al. eds., 2014) (providing an excellent discussion of the role of algorithms in 
producing and certifying publicly relevant information). For discussions of the transformation 
provided by the deployment of algorithms, see generally PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER 
ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 
(2015); CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME TO RULE OUR WORLD 
(2012). 
 3. DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at xi. 
 4. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision 
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1149 (2017) (“Many products and 
services, including email spam filters, medical diagnoses, product marketing, and self-driving 
cars, . . . depend on machine-learning algorithms and their ability to deliver astonishing 
forecasting power and speed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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benefits to all5—or, for that matter, all countries across the world.6 Just 
as the “digital divide” has separated those with access to the Internet, 
information technology, and digital content from those without,7 an 
emerging and ever-widening “algorithmic divide” now prevents a large 
segment of the population—in both developed and developing 
countries—from enjoying access to machine learning and artificial 
intelligence. Without such access, those who are on the unfortunate side 
of the divide will miss out on the many political, social, economic, 
cultural, educational, and career opportunities provided by machine 
learning and artificial intelligence. Even worse, the lack of access to these 
technologies will trigger a vicious cycle in which the technology rich will 
get richer and the gap between the have and have-nots will widen even 
further.8 
Although policy makers, commentators, and the mass media have 
paid growing attention to algorithmic bias9 and the shortcomings of 
machine learning and artificial intelligence, the algorithmic divide has yet 
 
 5. See discussion infra Section II.A (discussing algorithmic deprivation). 
 6. As the International Telecommunication Union noted in an issue paper: 
According to the simulation, economies with higher readiness to benefit from AI 
may achieve absorption levels about 11 percentage points higher than those of 
slow adopters by 2023, and this gap looks set to widen to about 23 percentage 
points by 2030. This indicates that like the digital divide, an AI divide may 
emerge between advanced and developing economies. 
INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 32 
(2018); see also GREGG ALLEN & TANIEL CHAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY 40–41 (2017) (discussing how “[a] country with a significant advantage in AI-based 
intelligence analysis achieves decisive strategic advantage decision-making and shaping”); 
JACQUES BUGHIN ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., NOTES FROM THE AI FRONTIER MODELING THE 
IMPACT OF AI ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 1 (2018) (“Those that establish themselves as AI leaders 
(mostly developed economies) could capture an additional 20 to 25 percent in economic benefits 
compared with today, while emerging economies may capture only half their upside.”); LEE KAI-
FU, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 169 (2018) 
(expressing concern about the fast-growing “divide between the AI haves and have-nots”); 
William J. Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 24), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403712 [https://perma.cc/26R9-NVE4] (noting the 
worry about the benefits that artificial intelligence has provided to “actors that have the scientific 
know-how, research budgets, and access to information that are necessary to develop artificial 
intelligence systems”). 
 7. See generally Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information 
Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the digital divide). 
 8. See Ralph Hamann, Developing Countries Need to Wake Up to the Risks of New 
Technologies, CONVERSATION (Jan. 4, 2018, 2:06 AM), https://theconversation.com/developing-
countries-need-to-wake-up-to-the-risks-of-new-technologies-87213 [https://perma.cc/YE9H-
DPFD] (“Elites within these countries will be more likely to make use of AI and other new 
technologies. This will further increase returns to capital widening the gap between elites’ 
productive capacity and that of everyone else.”). 
 9. See discussion infra Section II.B (discussing algorithmic biases). 
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to attract much policy and scholarly attention.10 To fill this lacuna, Part I 
draws on the digital divide literature to systematically analyze this new 
inequitable gap between the technology haves and have-nots. Utilizing 
an analytical framework that the Author developed in the early 2000s,11 
this Part discusses the five attributes of the algorithmic divide: (1) 
awareness; (2) access; (3) affordability; (4) availability; and (5) 
adaptability. 
Part II turns to three major problems precipitated by an emerging and 
fast-expanding algorithmic divide: (1) algorithmic deprivation; (2) 
algorithmic discrimination; and (3) algorithmic distortion. While the first 
two problems affect primarily those on the unfortunate side of the divide, 
the last problem impacts individuals on both sides. Taken together, all of 
these problems show that the algorithmic divide has posed challenges not 
only to the poor, the disadvantaged, and the vulnerable, but to virtually 
everybody in what Jack Balkin has called an “Algorithmic Society.”12 
 
 10. Most of the discussions in this area are found in popular media. See, e.g., Jacques 
Bughin & James Manyika, Technology Convergence and AI Divides: A Simulation Appraisal, 
VOX (Sept. 7, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/technology-convergence-and-ai-divides [https:// 
perma.cc/5RN6-42WC] (discussing three levels of the artificial intelligence divide: “individuals 
(workers), companies, and countries” (emphasis omitted)); Cosette Jarrett, AI Could Be Driving 
a New Digital Divide, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 5, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/ 
10/05/ai-could-be-driving-a-new-digital-divide/ [https://perma.cc/TLR2-RVCV] (discussing the 
corporate artificial intelligence divide); Vyacheslav Polonski, AI Trust and AI Fears: A Media 
Debate That Could Divide Society, MEDIUM (Jan. 9, 2018), https://medium.com/@drpolonski/ai-
trust-and-ai-fears-a-media-debate-that-could-divide-society-52e16a74c979 [https://perma.cc/ 
L3Y9-R3CE] (discussing the divide between those who trust artificial intelligence and those who 
do not); Anjana Susarla, The New Digital Divide Is Between People Who Opt Out of Algorithms 
and People Who Don’t, CONVERSATION (Apr. 17, 2019, 6:54 AM), https://theconversation.com/ 
the-new-digital-divide-is-between-people-who-opt-out-of-algorithms-and-people-who-dont-114 
719 [https://perma.cc/PH84-V2BP] (discussing the digital divide between those who opt out of 
algorithms and those who do not). A rare exception is a white paper released by the International 
Development Research Centre: 
This AI divide transcends geographic, socio-economic, gender, and race 
boundaries. The infrastructure required for the development of AI applications 
restricts this activity, for the most part, to locales with sufficient computing 
power, access to (or resources to collect) relevant data, and the requisite AI skills. 
The geography of the participation gap is perhaps best illustrated by the relative 
dominance of a few countries (and a few large tech companies) in the 
development of AI. 
MATTHEW L. SMITH & SUJAYA NEUPANE, INT’L DEV. RESEARCH CTR., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA 58 (2018), https://www.idrc.ca/ 
sites/default/files/ai_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB96-R6V5]. 
 11. See Yu, supra note 7, at 8–16 (providing the framework). 
 12. Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy: 
The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1219 (2017) (defining 
“Algorithmic Society” as “a society organized around social and economic decision-making by 
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Part III proposes seven non-exhaustive clusters of remedial actions to 
help bridge this emerging and ever-widening divide. To fashion a holistic 
response to address the three problems identified earlier and taking note 
of the “multidimensional phenomenon” generated by the algorithmic 
divide,13 this Part outlines solutions that combine law, communications 
policy, ethical principles, institutional mechanisms, and business 
practices.14 While it will not be easy to bridge this divide, these solutions 
strive to ensure greater access to machine learning and artificial 
intelligence and, in turn, equality in the age of artificial intelligence. 
I.  ATTRIBUTES 
Although the algorithmic divide has not yet garnered much policy and 
scholarly attention, those commentators who have studied this divide 
have remarked on the strong resemblance between this new inequitable 
gap and the earlier digital divide.15 The latter began attracting 
considerable interest and attention two and a half decades ago.16 From the 
mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the Clinton Administration released four 
 
algorithms, robots, and AI agents, who not only make the decisions but also, in some cases, carry 
them out”). Aneesh Aneesh would go further to describe an algorithm-pervasive society as an 
“algocracy.” A. ANEESH, VIRTUAL MIGRATION: THE PROGRAMMING OF GLOBALIZATION 5 (2006) 
(defining “algocracy” as the “rule of the algorithm[] or [the] rule of the code” and noting that such 
governance structure is “the key difference between the current and previous rounds of global 
integration”). See generally Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 4 (discussing whether the use of 
machine-learning algorithms, robotic decision tools, and artificial intelligence by government 
agencies can pass muster under core administrative and constitutional law doctrines). 
 13. Cf. PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION POVERTY, AND 
THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE 4 (2001) (calling for “the concept of the digital divide [to be] 
understood as a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing three distinct aspects”—namely the 
“global divide,” the “social divide,” and the “democratic divide”); JAN A.G.M. VAN DIJK, THE 
DEEPENING DIVIDE: INEQUALITY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 3 (2005) (conceiving of the digital 
divide “as a social and political problem, not a technological one”). 
 14. See INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, ETHICALLY ALIGNED DESIGN: A VISION FOR 
PRIORITIZING HUMAN WELL-BEING WITH AUTONOMOUS AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 58 (2017), 
https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-standards/standards/web/documents/other/ead_v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/389L-CKSW] (noting the need for “meaningful interdisciplinary collaboration” 
between engineers and designers of autonomous and intelligent systems, on the one hand, and 
“ethicists, legal scholars, and social scientists, both in academia and industry,” on the other). 
 15. See sources cited supra note 10 (collecting sources that refer to the algorithmic or 
artificial intelligence divide as the “new digital divide”). 
 16. See VAN DIJK, supra note 13, at 1 (“At the end of the 1990s, the issue of the so-called 
digital divide was suddenly put on the agenda of public, political, and scholarly debate, starting 
in the United States and spreading to Europe and the rest of the world.”); JAN VAN DIJK, THE 
DIGITAL DIVIDE 1 (2020) (“In the year 2020 both the concept of and the research into the digital 
divide will be twenty-five years old. In 1995 the term ‘digital divide’ was first used in a number 
of newspapers in the United States.”). 
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detailed surveys in a series entitled Falling Through the Net.17 Since then, 
book-length treatments of the digital divide have been published.18 Two 
U.S. law reviews have also organized symposia to explore the topic.19 
While issues relating to the digital divide no longer attract as much 
attention as they used to, they remain relevant in the public policy debate 
and come back from time to time, especially around presidential 
elections.20 
In the past few years, commentators have begun to pay greater 
attention to the algorithmic or artificial intelligence divide.21 Some 
commentators have recently referred to this divide as the “new digital 
divide,” noting the parallels between this inequitable gap and the earlier 
 
 17. In chronological order, these four surveys were as follows: NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: A SURVEY OF THE “HAVE NOTS” 
IN RURAL AND URBAN AMERICA (1995), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED399126.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2HXV-KE2S]; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
FALLING THROUGH THE NET II: NEW DATA ON THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (1998), https://www.ntia. 
doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/falling-through-net-ii.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3MK-X8LQ]; 
NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: 
DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (1999), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/fttn99/ 
FTTN.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZGE-YMEE]; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION (2000) [hereinafter 
FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/fttn00.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y622-JUZY]. Upon the arrival of the George W. Bush Administration, the 
digital divide was no longer a key governmental concern. Instead of Falling Through the Net, the 
survey became A Nation Online. See NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: HOW AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING THEIR USE OF THE INTERNET 
(2002); see also Yu, supra note 7, at 33–35 (noting the comparison made by Federal 
Communications Commission Chairman Michael Powell of the digital divide to the “Mercedes 
Divide”). 
 18. See, e.g., RANETA LAWSON MACK, THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: STANDING AT THE 
INTERSECTION OF RACE & TECHNOLOGY (2001); NORRIS, supra note 13; ANNE PEACOCK, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (2019); MASSIMO RAGNEDDA, THE THIRD DIGITAL DIVIDE: A 
WEBERIAN APPROACH TO DIGITAL INEQUALITIES (2017); THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: FACING A CRISIS OR 
CREATING A MYTH? (Benjamin M. Compaine ed., 2001); THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: THE INTERNET AND 
SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Massimo Ragnedda & Glenn W. Muschert 
eds., 2013); THEORIZING DIGITAL DIVIDES (Massimo Ragnedda & Glenn W. Muschert eds., 2018); 
VAN DIJK, supra note 13; VAN DIJK, supra note 16; MARK WARSCHAUER, TECHNOLOGY AND 
SOCIAL INCLUSION: RETHINKING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (2003). 
 19.  Symposium, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002); Symposium, Digital Divide, Digital Opportunities, 24 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 449 (2002). 
 20. See, e.g., John Hendel, Democrats Torch Trump Failures on Rural Digital Divide, 
POLITICO (Aug. 17, 2019, 6:37 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/17/rural-digital-
divide-democratic-candidates-1655290 [https://perma.cc/Z32S-YDMJ] (“Several presidential 
candidates including Joe Biden, Elizabeth Warren and Pete Buttigieg have rolled out proposals 
for tens of billions in new federal dollars to bring fast broadband service to rural America, with 
Warren’s $85 billion plan leading the spending pack.”). 
 21. See sources cited supra note 10 (collecting sources that discuss the algorithmic or 
artificial intelligence divide). 
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digital divide.22 Given the similarities, this Part draws on prior research 
in the digital divide literature to explore ways to systematically analyze 
the new algorithmic divide. Specifically, this Part utilizes the analytical 
framework that this Author developed in the early 2000s to examine the 
five attributes of the algorithmic divide: (1) awareness; (2) access; (3) 
affordability; (4) availability; and (5) adaptability.23 
A.  Awareness 
While those on the unfortunate side of the digital divide can easily 
notice their being left out of the Internet revolution,24 especially after the 
medium entered the mainstream in the mid-1990s, those on the 
unfortunate side of the algorithmic divide may have greater difficulty 
discovering their exclusion from machine learning and artificial 
intelligence.25 Indeed, many individuals on this unfortunate side may not 
appreciate how the increased use of machine-learning algorithms and 
intelligent machines can impact their lives—both positively and 
negatively. Even among those who take note of these impacts, most will 
have a very limited understanding of how algorithms actually operate.26 
In this age of artificial intelligence, individuals—in both developed 
and developing countries—will need to become more aware of the 
strengths and drawbacks of algorithm-enhanced technological products 
and services. While such enhancement enables individuals to do things 
that they otherwise could not accomplish with traditional computing 
technology, these new technologies could also backfire when biased 
 
 22. See, e.g., LEE RAINIE & JANNA ANDERSON, CODE-DEPENDENT: PROS AND CONS OF THE 
ALGORITHM AGE 13 (2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 
9/2017/02/PI_2017.02.08_Algorithms_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8KA-CU6X] (linking to 
the digital divide the new divide between those “whose capabilities and perception of the world 
is augmented by sensors and processed with powerful AI and connected to vast amounts of data” 
and “those who don’t have access to those tools or knowledge of how to utilize them” (quoting 
Ryan Hayes, Owner, Fit to Tweet)); Jarrett, supra note 10 (“There may be a new digital divide 
forming . . . . As artificial intelligence continues to grow and become more commonplace, some 
experts fear there may be significant disadvantages for companies—and their employees—who 
don’t have access to AI resources.”); Susarla, supra note 10 (noting in the title that “[t]he new 
digital divide is between people who opt out of algorithms and people who don’t”). 
 23. See Yu, supra note 7, at 8–16 (discussing these attributes). This typology has been used 
or endorsed by other scholars in the digital divide literature. See, e.g., ROLF H. WEBER, SHAPING 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE: REGULATORY CHALLENGES 251–52 (2009) (recalling the five key 
prerequisites for bridging the digital divide articulated in the earlier article). 
 24. See Scott Louie, The New Invisible Man, YO! YOUTH OUTLOOK (Nov. 1, 1999) 
(describing experience as “the new millennium’s Invisible Man” after unplugging the modem for 
a few days), cited in Yu, supra note 7, at 9 n.49. 
 25. See BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 13 (2018) 
(“[T]echno-social engineering can mold us while going unnoticed and unchallenged . . . .”). 
 26. See infra text accompanying note 116 (discussing the limited understanding of 
algorithmic operations). 
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algorithms steer individuals away from the active or equal participation 
in the new technological environment. The harm that these algorithms 
could cause may range from “biases and bugs”27 to the dehumanizing 
aspect of algorithmic operations.28 
B.  Access 
Access is the most widely discussed attribute of the algorithmic 
divide. While the use of algorithms can provide important individual and 
societal benefits, not everybody has access to algorithm-enhanced 
technological products and services. At the domestic level, individuals 
will be shut out because they cannot afford these products and services, 
cannot find them on the local market, or do not have the needed skills to 
use them effectively.29 
At the global level, the access challenge has become even more acute, 
especially when one takes into consideration the limited access to 
computing, Internet, and sophisticated communication technologies in 
the developing world.30 While the Internet-penetration rates for Japan, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom are over 90%, the 
corresponding rates for Burundi, the Central African Republic, Eritrea, 
 
 27. ANDREW MCAFEE & ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, MACHINE, PLATFORM, CROWD: HARNESSING 
OUR DIGITAL FUTURE 53 (2017). 
 28. See FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 25, at 1 (“[T]echno-social engineering of 
humans exists on an unprecedented scale and scope, and it is only growing more pervasive as we 
embed networked sensors in our public and private spaces, our devices, our clothing, and 
ourselves.”); LEE, supra note 6, at 173 (noting that artificial intelligence will provide “a direct 
assault on [the] sense of identity and purpose” of many workers); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra 
note 22, at 9–11, 42–56 (surveying views on the loss of humanity and human judgment when data 
and predictive modeling become paramount); Andrew C. Michaels, Artificial Intelligence, Legal 
Change, and Separation of Powers, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 28), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3459069 [https://perma.cc/4J7P-48ME] (“[T]he arguments for AI 
judges underappreciate and undervalue the human aspects of law.”); see also Guido Noto La 
Diega, Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-Making—Algorithmic Decisions at the 
Crossroads of Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and Freedom of Information, 9 J. INTELL. 
PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 3, 33 (2018) (“[W]e should trust our fellow human 
beings over the algorithms, despite developments in artificial intelligence allowing the 
deployment of increasingly refined legal applications.”). 
 29. See discussion infra Sections I.C, I.D, I.E (discussing unaffordability, unavailability, 
and inadaptability). 
 30. See Maria De-Arteaga et al., Machine Learning for the Developing World, ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON MGMT. INFO. SYS., Aug. 2018, at 9:1, 9:2 (“Availability of data, computational 
capacity, and Internet accessibility are often markedly more limited than in developed 
countries.”); Yu, supra note 7, at 4–5 (discussing the alarming disparities between developed and 
developing countries in their access to information technology); see also Pratap Khedkar & 
Dharmendra Sahay, Trends in Healthcare and Medical Innovation, in THE GLOBAL INNOVATION 
INDEX 2019: CREATING HEALTHY LIVES—THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL INNOVATION 87, 87 (Soumitra 
Dutta et al. eds., 2019) (noting that “90% of the developed world and 41% of the developing world 
[are] on broadband”). 
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and Western Sahara are around or below 5%.31 As a result, access to 
algorithm-enhanced technological products and services in the 
developing world cannot be taken for granted. As stated in the final report 
of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital 
Cooperation, cochaired by Melinda Gates and Jack Ma: 
Well more than half the world’s population still either lacks 
affordable access to the internet or is using only a fraction of 
its potential despite being connected. People who lack safe 
and affordable access to digital technologies are 
overwhelmingly from groups who are already marginalised: 
women, elderly people and those with disabilities; 
indigenous groups; and those who live in poor, remote or 
rural areas.32 
To a large extent, much of the prior research on information and 
communication technology for development33—or “ICT4D” for short—
can provide instructive lessons for addressing development-related 
challenges in the age of artificial intelligence.34 Among the strategies 
proposed for developing countries are an increase in the ability to handle 
small and messy datasets, the development of intelligent data-acquisition 
strategies and compression algorithms, the creation of transfer-learning 
 
 31. See Internet in Europe Stats, INTERNET WORLD STATS, https://www.internet 
worldstats.com/stats4.htm [https://perma.cc/M6J6-P2Y7] (last updated July 24, 2019) (reporting 
the Internet-penetration rate for the United Kingdom at 94.6%); Internet Usage in Asia, INTERNET 
WORLD STATS, https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm [https://perma.cc/9Q4B-T3BW] 
(last updated Sept. 26, 2019) (reporting the Internet-penetration rate for Japan at 93.5%); Internet 
Usage Statistics for All the Americas, INTERNET WORLD STATS, https://internetworld 
stats.com/stats2.htm [https://perma.cc/A2EJ-2ZQ2] (last updated Sept. 10, 2019) (reporting the 
Internet-penetration rate for the United States at 95.6%); Internet Users Statistics for Africa, 
INTERNET WORLD STATS, https://internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm [https://perma.cc/5ZGM-
ULSH] (last updated Nov. 6, 2019) (reporting the Internet-penetration rates for Burundi, the 
Central African Republic, Eritrea, and Western Sahara at 5.3%, 5.3%, 1.3%, and 4.8%, 
respectively). 
 32. U.N. Sec’y-Gen.’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation, The Age of Digital 
Interdependence, at 6 (June 10, 2019) [hereinafter High-level Panel Report] (footnote omitted). 
 33. See Amir Hatem Ali, Note, The Power of Social Media in Developing Nations: New 
Tools for Closing the Global Digital Divide and Beyond, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 193 (2011) 
(“Proponents of addressing the digital divide argue that economic depravity, poor education, and 
deficient healthcare might be addressed on a structural level by providing developing nations with 
infrastructure and skills to compete in the national economy, in which ICT [information and 
communication technology] is undoubtedly an essential tool.”). See generally Executive Board of 
U.N. Development Programme & U.N. Population Fund, Role of UNDP in Information and 
Communication Technology for Development, U.N. Doc. DP/2001/CRP.8 (June 8, 2001) 
(discussing the ICT4D efforts taken by the U.N. Development Programme). 
 34. See generally De-Arteaga et al., supra note 30 (examining the burgeoning literature on 
“machine learning for the developing world”). 
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models35 for low-resource languages, the facilitation of machine learning 
with limited computational capabilities, and the utilization of decision 
support systems.36 
C.  Affordability 
Affordability goes hand in hand with access, yet the two attributes 
raise different considerations. While the lack of economic and 
technological resources may lead to inaccessibility, it could also 
determine the type of product and service that an individual could access 
and the frequency at which that individual could utilize the selected 
product or service. In addition, because affordability limits one’s ability 
to “upgrad[e] the equipment, software, and training support,”37 this 
attribute of the algorithmic divide will affect the overall quality of the 
products and services that the individual enjoys. 
To a large extent, affordability determines not only individual access 
to machine learning and artificial intelligence but also one’s ability to 
fully participate in the artificial intelligence revolution. The less access 
one can afford, the more limited benefits one will secure from algorithm-
enhanced technological products and services, and the less likely one will 
be able to fully realize the promise of machine learning and artificial 
intelligence. 
D.  Availability 
There is a general assumption that individuals will have the needed 
technological products or services if machine-learning capabilities 
become accessible and affordable. Yet, that assumption cannot always be 
supported given the differing individual needs for products and 
services.38 It is not uncommon that the specific type of product or service 
needed by an individual does not exist. Even if it does, that product or 
service may feature algorithms designed by those who do not fully grasp 
the user’s specific needs, interests, conditions, and priorities, especially 
those in the developing world. As Ralph Hamann lamented: “AI 
algorithms are developed almost entirely in developed regions. Thus they 
may not sufficiently reflect the contexts and priorities of developing 
countries.”39 
 
 35. For overviews of “transfer learning” in the deep learning context, see generally JOHN 
D. KELLEHER, DEEP LEARNING 236–37 (2019); Jason Brownlee, A Gentle Introduction to Transfer 
Learning for Deep Learning, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Dec. 20, 2017), https://machine 
learningmastery.com/transfer-learning-for-deep-learning/ [https://perma.cc/M9N8-9GVU]. 
 36. De-Arteaga et al., supra note 30, at 9:9 to :10. 
 37. Yu, supra note 7, at 12. 
 38. See id. at 13 (“Even with Internet access, many people may not be able to find 
information that is relevant to their lives and communities.”). 
 39. Hamann, supra note 8. 
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Since the mid-2010s, commentators have widely discussed the 
problem of algorithmic bias and discrimination,40 which Section II.B will 
discuss in greater detail. While this problem has produced undesirable 
outcomes that harm select individuals, it could shut these individuals out 
of access entirely. Thus, regardless of whether they are intentional,41 
algorithmic bias and discrimination threaten to take away the benefits that 
machine learning and artificial intelligence provide to a large segment of 
the population. 
E.  Adaptability 
If individuals are to succeed in the age of artificial intelligence, they 
will need to take advantage of the different algorithm-enhanced 
technological products and services. They will also need to adapt these 
new technologies to their individual needs.42 Only after they have made 
successful adaptation can they realize the full potential of machine 
learning and artificial intelligence. 
Adaptability, however, requires both knowledge and understanding 
(in addition to awareness). In this age of artificial intelligence, 
algorithmic literacy is just as important as algorithmic awareness. As 
Section III.A will discuss in greater detail, policy makers will need to put 
in place programs to enhance the algorithmic literacy of their 
constituencies.43 Should those on the unfortunate side of the algorithmic 
 
 40. See generally Nizan Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Learning Algorithms and 
Discrimination, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 88 (Woodrow 
Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) (discussing discrimination in the context of machine-learning 
algorithms); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. 
REV. 671 (2016) (discussing the disparate impact caused by the use of big-data analytics); 
Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519 (2018) (examining 
algorithmic decision-making through an antistereotypical lens); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in 
Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019) (discussing algorithm-generated racial 
inequity in the criminal justice system); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 857 (2017) (discussing data-driven discrimination in the employment 
context); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017) 
(discussing the disparate impact caused by the use of big-data analytics to provide predictive 
policing); Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
1375 (2014) (discussing discrimination in social-scoring systems). 
 41. See Balkin, supra note 12, at 1233 (“We can’t argue that the algorithm itself has bad 
intentions. Rather, the algorithm is used by human beings who want to achieve some particular 
set of managerial goals, but in the process, end up harming various groups of people.”). 
 42. Cf. Yu, supra note 7, at 15 (“Access to information technology and Internet content 
is . . . useful only if people are able to adapt to the changing technological environment and to use 
the new technological tools effectively.”). 
 43. See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing the need to increase algorithmic literacy). 
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divide fail to adequately respond to this fast-evolving technological 
environment, they will likely be left behind.44 
II.  PROBLEMS 
Although Part I focused on the five attributes of the algorithmic 
divide, it is important not to dismiss this divide as a mere theoretical 
construct. Instead, the divide has generated three real-life problems that 
will deeply affect whether and how individuals are to benefit from 
machine learning and artificial intelligence. While the first two 
problems—algorithmic deprivation and algorithmic discrimination—
have primary impacts on those on the unfortunate side of the algorithmic 
divide, the last problem—algorithmic distortion—affects virtually 
everybody. Taken together, these three problems demonstrate how the 
emerging and ever-widening algorithmic divide will affect all users in 
some way regardless of whether they sit on the fortunate or unfortunate 
side. 
A.  Algorithmic Deprivation 
As the previous Part noted, those who have no access to algorithm-
enhanced technological products and services will be shut out of the 
benefits provided by machine learning and artificial intelligence. 
Although commentators have documented the various problems caused 
by algorithms and intelligent machines, one cannot overlook the many 
promises that these technologies provide,45 especially in areas in which 
they have shown to have outperformed human actors.46 Just like all other 
 
 44. One commentator described the adaptation process as follows: 
Smart(er) new apps and platforms will require people to learn how to understand 
the nature of the new experience, learn how it is guided by software, and learn to 
interact with the new environment. That has tended to be followed by a catch-up 
by people who learn then to game the system, as well as navigate it more speedily 
and reject experiences that don’t meet expectations or needs. The major risk is 
that less-regular users, especially those who cluster on one or two sites or 
platforms, won’t develop that navigational and selection facility and will be at a 
disadvantage. 
RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 63 (quoting Pete Cranston, Co-Dir., Euroforic Servs.). 
 45. See AMY PAUL ET AL., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., REFLECTING THE PAST, SHAPING 
THE FUTURE: MAKING AI WORK FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 4 (2018), https://www.usaid. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/15396/AI-ML-in-Development.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8TT-
AGEY] (“Emerging [machine-learning and artificial-intelligence] applications promise to reshape 
healthcare, agriculture, and democracy in the developing world. [These technologies] show 
tremendous potential for helping to achieve sustainable development objectives globally.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 46. Examples abound in the health area: 
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new technologies, algorithm-enhanced technological products and 
services have their strengths and drawbacks.47 
 
AI technology has been utilized to improve the quality of medical diagnosis, 
especially in radiology, due to the large volumes of medical image data. A 
radiologist, Keith Dreyer at Harvard Medical School, claimed that “Meaningful 
AI will improve quality, efficiency, and outcomes.” Esteva et al. trained deep 
convolutional neural networks (CNN) based on a dataset of 129,450 clinical 
images to diagnose skin cancer. The results demonstrated that this system is able 
to classify skin cancer at a comparable level to dermatologists. They 
hypothesized that smartphones might be a low-cost method of helping to extend 
the reach of dermatologists to improve access to diagnostic care. Liu from 
Google, Inc. reported a CNN framework to aid the pathological diagnosis of 
breast cancer metastasis in lymph nodes. The results showed that this system 
could improve the speed, accuracy, and consistency of diagnosis, as well as 
reduce the false negative rate to a quarter of the rate experienced by human 
pathologists. 
Jonathan Guo & Li Bin, The Application of Medical Artificial Intelligence Technology in Rural 
Areas of Developing Countries, 2 HEALTH EQUITY 174, 175 (2018) (footnotes omitted); see also 
Digital Decisions, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., https://cdt.org/files/2018/09/Digital-Decisions 
-Library-Printer-Friendly-as-of-20180927.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVA8-BD5V] (“Algorithms can 
help doctors read and prioritize X-rays, and they are better and faster than humans at detecting 
credit card fraud.” (footnote omitted)). 
 47. As Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson observed in their new book, Machine 
Platform Crowd: 
We . . . see both a challenge and opportunity in the growing reliance on 
algorithmic decision making. The challenge is that this approach can embed and 
perpetuate unfair, harmful, and unwanted biases. What’s worse, these biases may 
emerge despite the best intentions of the designers to create unbiased systems, 
and they may be difficult to identify without extensive testing. All system design 
must confront this challenge. 
The opportunity is that machine-based systems typically can be tested and 
improved. And once corrected, they are unlikely to make the same mistake again. 
In contrast, it is a lot harder to get humans to acknowledge their biases (how 
many avowed racists or sexists do you know?), let alone the hard work required 
to overcome them. The ultimate standard for adopting a decision-making 
system—whether based on machines, on humans, or on some combination of the 
two—cannot realistically be perfection. Any system is likely to make mistakes 
and have biases. Instead, the goal should be to choose an approach that minimizes 
biases and errors, and that allows them to be easily and quickly corrected. 
MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 27, at 52–53; see also RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, 
at 2 (“Algorithms are aimed at optimizing everything. They can save lives, make things easier, 
and conquer chaos. Still, experts worry they can also put too much control in the hands of 
corporations and governments, perpetuate bias, create filter bubbles, cut choices, creativity and 
serendipity, and could result in greater unemployment.” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 18 (“If we use 
machine learning models rigorously, they will make things better; if we use them to paper over 
injustice with the veneer of machine empiricism, it will be worse.” (quoting Cory Doctorow, 
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Thus far, commentators have identified a number of areas in which 
machine learning and artificial intelligence can help the poor, the 
vulnerable, and the disadvantaged.48 To underscore the promise of these 
technologies, this Section highlights their benefits in the developing 
world. Even though these benefits also inure to those in the developed 
world,49 the illustrations focus on developing countries for two reasons. 
First, because these countries contain some of the world’s most 
disadvantaged populations, the illustrations’ usefulness will go beyond 
the developing world. Second, as the digital divide literature has shown, 
more research has been, and will be, devoted to communications issues 
involving the poor and the disadvantaged in developed countries.50 This 
Section therefore highlights developments that are unlikely to receive the 
needed attention from policy makers and commentators.51 
The first area that provides an excellent illustration of the promise of 
machine learning and artificial intelligence is disaster relief. The oft cited 
example is Nepal, which suffered from a devastating earthquake in 
Kathmandu, its capital, in April 2015.52 Shortly after that earthquake, 
machine learning and artificial intelligence were deployed, alongside 
drones and other automated devices, to facilitate the rescue, relief, and 
 
Author)). One may recall similar “good or evil” analyses regarding other new media technologies, 
which range from film to television to the Internet. See NORRIS, supra note 13, at 232 (“Previous 
technological breakthroughs have commonly generated exaggerated hopes that machines can 
transform society and democracy. Luddites fear for the worse, but technophiles hope for the 
better.”); RAGNEDDA, supra note 18, at 22 (noting the differing views of techno-optimists, techno-
skeptics, and techno-pessimists concerning whether the Internet reduces or reinforces social 
inequalities). 
 48. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 52–70. 
 49. See EUBANKS, supra note 2, at 81–82 (“New high-tech tools allow for more precise 
measuring and tracking, better sharing of information, and increased visibility of targeted 
populations. In a system dedicated to supporting poor and working-class people’s self-
determination, such diligence would guarantee that they attain all the benefits they are entitled to 
by law.”). But see NORRIS, supra note 13, at 10 (“Technological opportunities are often unevenly 
distributed, even in nations like Australia, the United States, and Sweden at the forefront of the 
information society.”). 
 50. See, e.g., MACK, supra note 18 (discussing the digital divide and the intersection of race 
and technology, with a focus on the United States); FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV, supra note 17 
(providing the concluding report of the Clinton Administration’s Falling Through the Net series). 
 51. For additional examples, see generally materials provided through the “AI for Good” 
Global Summit, organized by the International Telecommunication Union. AI FOR GOOD GLOBAL 
SUMMIT, https://aiforgood.itu.int/ [https://perma.cc/P9GN-NFNL]. 
 52. See Mark Brown, Nepal Earthquake Destroys Kathmandu Valley’s Architectural 
Treasures, GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2015, 2:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/ 
27/nepal-earthquake-destroys-kathmandu-valleys-architecture-buildings-heritage [https://perma. 
cc/VT6V-9VL3] (reporting the earthquake). 
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reconstruction efforts.53 As a Nepalese executive of a New York–based 
provider of artificial intelligence solutions and services recounted: 
[P]redictive models for disaster relief enable first responders 
to automatically analyze large-scale behavior and movement 
through multiple sources of data including social media 
platforms, web forums, news sources, etc. Based on 
collected data, responders can scale reconstruction efforts 
and distribute supplies in a timely manner. In 2015, when a 
major earthquake hit Nepal, more than 8 million people were 
affected. During the aftermath, drones were used to map and 
assess the destruction and speed up the rescue mission. 
The town of Sankhu, situated about 20 kilometers 
northeast of Kathmandu, was among the highly affected 
locations. In May 2018, my company Fusemachines and 
GeoSpatial Systems partnered with Sankhu’s city officials to 
use drones and artificial intelligence in an effort to 
automatically estimate the reconstruction need. After 
processing data accumulated from a drone-powered aerial 
mapping of the region, the team fed this data to advanced 
machine learning algorithms. Combining drone imagery, 
digital mapping and machine learning, the team configured 
region modeling and infrastructure development with higher 
accuracy.54 
 
 53. See Sameer Maskey, AI for Humanity: Using AI to Make a Positive Impact in 
Developing Countries, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbes 
techcouncil/2018/08/23/ai-for-humanity-using-ai-to-make-a-positive-impact-in-developing-
countries-2 [https://perma.cc/MED5-VPA3] (recounting the disaster rescue, relief, and 
reconstruction efforts in Nepal); see also How AI Is Helping Undeveloped and Developing 
Countries, DAY TRANSLATIONS (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.daytranslations.com/blog/2018/ 
11/how-ai-is-helping-undeveloped-and-developing-countries-12899/ [https://perma.cc/BV8C-
MULL] (“The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs . . . used 
artificial intelligence to pinpoint and map all social media posts related to the Nepal earthquake 
emergency needs, damage to infrastructure, and disaster response activities.”). 
 54. Maskey, supra note 53. As another commentator explained: 
AI-assisted disaster response operations have become more efficient 
because of the smart consolidation of a myriad of information. It made it easy to 
find the best routes to take when going to a calamity-struck site as the AI system 
determined the infrastructure damaged and those that are still usable. Digital 
maps were generated to help aid workers in providing the needed help promptly 
and safely. It became easier to work on at least three types of data (texts, images, 
and videos). 
The system used by [the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs] is referred to as AIDR (Artificial Intelligence for Disaster 
Response). It is capable of learning from how it is being used and the data 
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The second area that showcases the benefits of machine learning and 
artificial intelligence is public health. Because the ratio between doctors 
and patients in developing countries is always dramatically higher than 
the corresponding ratio in their developed counterparts,55 the use of 
machine learning and artificial intelligence is badly needed to train 
doctors, nurses, and other health professionals as well as to provide 
medical assistance.56 In recent years, developing countries have 
successfully utilized these technologies to improve healthcare. As noted 
in a contribution to the Global Innovation Index 2019 report: 
China is turning to AI-based technologies to provide 
better healthcare, especially in rural areas where doctors are 
relying on perceptual senses, like vision and hearing, to 
gather information about patient health. In India, Arvind Eye 
Care is working with Google Brain to detect signs of 
diabetes-related eye disease by analyzing photographs.57 
 
inputted into it, allowing it to identify humanitarian aid needs automatically, sort 
data (according to the following categories: urgent needs, response efforts, and 
infrastructure damage), and disseminate accurate and useful information. The 
more AIDR is used, the better it gets. 
How AI Is Helping Undeveloped and Developing Countries, supra note 53. 
 55. See Guo & Li, supra note 46, at 177 (“Due to the poor working environment, it is 
difficult to attract and retain high-quality healthcare providers in rural areas. To compensate for 
the shortage of physicians, many developing countries launch some abbreviated training programs 
for becoming a physician, or they authorize nurses to perform certain physician tasks.”); Adebayo 
Alonge, How AI Can Help Africa Get Universal Health Care Before America, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 
30, 2017, 11:56 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/artificial-intelligence-us-healthcare-africa-
693849 [https://perma.cc/SRD2-UDEP] (“Across Africa, the ratio of doctors to patients is 
painfully low. The continent accounts for 25 percent of global disease cases, but has only 2–3 
percent of the doctors in the world.”). 
 56. As one commentator observed: 
In many places such as Nepal and Africa, human medical experts are rarely 
available. Physicians may need to consult with fellow doctors, particularly 
experts in specific fields. Artificial intelligence can fill the gap, providing the 
knowledge and analytical output doctors can use to come up with better diagnosis 
and treatment plans. 
How AI Is Helping Undeveloped and Developing Countries, supra note 53; see also Guo & Li, 
supra note 46, at 175 (“Although clinical work cannot be completely replaced by AI robot doctors 
in the foreseeable future, medical AI technology will play a huge role in electronic health 
records . . . , diagnosis, treatment protocol development, patient monitoring and care, 
personalized medicine, robotic surgery, and health system management.”); id. at 176 
(“[T]elerobots can facilitate communication between patients with medical professionals; 
assistive walking devices can help with maneuvering, walking, standing, or sitting; and animal-
like robots can communicate with and entertain patients. Robots can also be used in surgery as 
assistant surgeons.” (footnote omitted)). 
 57. Khedkar & Sahay, supra note 30, at 91 (footnote omitted). 
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In Rwanda, “Zipline is using drones to deliver medical supplies and blood 
to hospitals and clinics that are difficult to access by car.”58 
The third area that demonstrates the potential of machine learning and 
artificial intelligence is food production. In developing countries, farmers 
often have to travel long distances to sell crops, produce, and animals.59 
With the information they secure through predictive algorithms, such as 
crop prices, they will be in much better positions than in the past to 
determine when to sell products.60 Algorithm-enhanced technologies will 
also help them increase crop yield, telling them when to plant and fertilize 
and what seeds to use based on local climate and soil conditions.61 To a 
large extent, the Internet has already greatly improved the livelihoods of 
 
 58. Maskey, supra note 53. This delivery “has dramatically impacted people living in 
remote parts of the country because they are able to get medical help when needed,” and “[t]he 
drone system in Rwanda has . . . helped reduce waste of blood by 95%.” Id. 
 59. See Marcel Fafchamps & Ruth Vargas Hill, Selling at the Farmgate or Traveling to 
Market, 87 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 717, 718 (2005) (“In contrast with farmers in developed countries 
who often . . . enjoy good institutions and infrastructure, most farmers in developing countries 
are . . . geographically isolated . . . and outside the reach of formal market institutions.”). 
 60. See NITI AAYOG, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 20 (2018) 
(India), https://www.niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/NationalStrategy-for-
AI-Discussion-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7D8-MCNW] (noting that artificial intelligence “has 
the potential to address challenges such as inadequate demand prediction” and has been used for 
the “prediction of crop prices to inform sowing practices”). 
 61. As Bernard Marr observed: 
AI technology . . . can help researchers figure out the right genetic makeup to 
create seeds that generate the highest yield, the most nutrition, and the most 
disease-resistant strains of staple crops. There are 40,000 varieties of sorghum, a 
valuable cereal crop in developing countries such as Ethiopia and India. AI can 
be used to experiment with these varieties to develop the perfect crop. All the 
growth, genetic, and environmental data collected during research will be given 
to an AI model to process. AI algorithms are better able to review all the variables 
and varieties to identify patterns and insights faster than humans. Deep-learning 
AI will be able to comprehend the complex genetics of plants that will support 
better breeding of plants. Those more efficient plants will improve our food 
production. 
Bernard Marr, How Artificial Intelligence Can Help Fight World Hunger, SAP INSIDER (Jan. 10, 
2018), https://sapinsider.wispubs.com/Assets/Articles/2018/January/How-Artificial-Intelligence-
Can-Help-Fight-World-Hunger [https://perma.cc/WUD8-4D7T]; see also PAUL ET AL., supra 
note 45, at 26 (“[A machine-learning] model can recommend crop management practices that are 
tailored to local soil type, plant varieties, and climate forecasts.”); How AI Is Helping 
Undeveloped and Developing Countries, supra note 53 (“The [machine-generated] sowing 
advisories sent to farmers include information on the best time for land preparation, sowing date, 
and fertilizer application.”); Maskey, supra note 53 (“Farmers monitor crops more effectively and 
make better predictions on planting, weeding and harvesting using AI tools. It can also be used to 
analyze one plant at a time and add pesticides only to infected plants and trees instead of spraying 
pesticides across large swaths of crops.”). 
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farmers in developing countries.62 The use of machine learning and 
artificial intelligence will provide further improvements by giving them 
more and better information and by strengthening their predictive 
abilities. 
The fourth area that exemplifies the success provided by machine 
learning and artificial intelligence is education. Thus far, these 
technologies have been deployed to address the shortage of teachers and 
easily accessible schools.63 Computers equipped with learning algorithms 
have also been used as tutors.64 These “intelligent” tutors not only can 
track the participants’ progress but will also be able to adjust teaching 
coverage and pace based on such progress. As Nizan Packin and Yafit 
Lev-Aretz observed: 
Intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) have rapidly moved 
from laboratory experimental stages to real everyday use. 
When learners work on a problem-solving task, ITS track 
mental steps to diagnose errors and appraise their 
understanding of the domain. Learners can also enjoy ITS’s 
timely guidance, feedback and explanations, and be matched 
 
 62. See Charlie Mitchell, Technology Hope for African Farmers, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 15, 
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/3316885c-b07d-11e8-87e0-d84e0d934341 [https://perma.cc/ 
WT6N-FERU] (“[D]igital services allow smallholders to view real-time crop prices, raise capital 
and crowdfund on their computers and smart devices.”). 
 63. As one commentator recounted: 
In most developing countries, schools lack experienced teachers and resources 
to enhance students’ knowledge. As a result, many students still have to walk 
long distances to get to the nearest school, which has created education gaps, 
especially in rural areas. AI tools such as personalized learning assistants can 
simplify learning by making tutoring services and learning materials accessible 
to all students, wherever they are. Machines can be automated to help students 
learn basic concepts without a tutor . . . . This would allow students to learn at 
any time from anywhere. 
Maskey, supra note 53; see also De-Arteaga et al., supra note 30, at 9:6 (“[T]eacher shortages are 
common in rural areas of the developing world. If machines could augment and support human 
teaching responsibilities, this could help increase literacy and sharpen STEM [science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics] skills, paving a road to improve development.” 
(citation omitted)). For the benefits of both developed and developing countries, teaching robots 
can cover not only the present but also the past. See generally Michal Shur-Ofry & Guy Pessach, 
Robotic Collective Memory, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 975 (2019) (discussing issues raised by virtual 
witnesses who help convey memories from the Holocaust). 
 64. See U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. [UNESCO], ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
EDUCATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 12 (2019) (“AI 
was part of the vision promising to transform education by creating tutor systems that could 
personalise learning.”). 
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with learning activities at an individually-tailored level of 
difficulty and interest.65 
To better tailor the teaching and learning experiences to the participants’ 
specific needs, interests, and capabilities, these tutors can utilize the 
growing amount of open-access courseware that has already appeared in 
both developed and developing countries.66 Machine learning and 
artificial intelligence have also been utilized for grading and other 
purposes.67 
The last area that illuminates the possibilities generated by greater use 
of machine learning and artificial intelligence involves policy analysis. 
As Maria De-Arteaga and her collaborators observed, “Whether it is 
through knowledge-discovery models that improve our understanding of 
a phenomenon, or through predictive models that inform proactive 
policies, [machine learning] can be integrated as an essential component 
of decision support systems.”68 For instance, scientists have utilized 
machine-learning capabilities, survey data, and satellite images of 
differential nighttime luminosity to map poverty levels in African 
countries where estimates of consumption expenditure and asset wealth 
have been incomplete or lacking.69 A group of researchers at 
Development Seed also teamed up with the World Bank to utilize big-
 
 65. Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 40, at 108. A frequently cited example is Cape Town–
based Daptio: 
Daptio [is] an adaptive learning platform that makes use of artificial intelligence 
to help students study remotely. It specializes in courses whose content, 
structure, and assessments are designed to adjust based on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the students. Daptio is designed to serve a learning model that is 
deemed best suited to a specific student. 
How AI Is Helping Undeveloped and Developing Countries, supra note 53; see also UNESCO, 
supra note 64, at 14 (discussing Daptio). 
 66. A widely cited example is the open courseware provided by the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. See Mass. Inst. of Tech., MIT OPEN COURSEWARE, https://ocw.mit.edu/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/94R5-TZFS]. 
 67. See Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 40, at 108 (“[M]assive open online courses and 
other models of online education increasingly use AI. Many of the popular online education 
platforms, including EdX, Coursera, and Udacity, use [natural-language processing], machine 
learning, and crowdsourcing for grading students’ assignments and programming tasks.”); see 
also UNESCO, supra note 64, at 13 (“A dual-teacher model entailing a teacher and a virtual 
teaching assistant, which can take over the teacher’s routine task, frees up teachers’ time, enabling 
them to focus on student guidance and one-to-one communication.”). 
 68. De-Arteaga et al., supra note 30, at 9:7. 
 69. Neal Jean et al., Combining Satellite Imagery and Machine Learning to Predict Poverty, 
353 SCIENCE 790, 790 (2016); see also PAUL ET AL., supra note 45, at 50 (“One of the most well-
developed use cases for [machine learning] in international development is the automated analysis 
of satellite imagery. . . . Satellite imagery can provide invaluable information about human 
settlement patterns, land use, and infrastructure.”). 
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data analytics and machine-learning capabilities to analyze the urban 
dynamics in Ethiopian lowlands.70 By providing greater, better, and more 
complete information, machine learning and artificial intelligence have 
put policy makers in better positions to design, evaluate, and improve 
policies. 
Taken together, the examples in these five areas illustrate the many 
benefits that machine learning and artificial intelligence have provided to 
developing countries. They explain why it is just as urgent to bridge the 
algorithmic divide in developing countries as it is to bridge that divide in 
developed countries. The examples also show that different areas need 
varying levels of access to machine learning and artificial intelligence.71 
While some areas, such as public health, food production, and education, 
need large-scale access to these technologies, other areas, such as disaster 
relief and policy analysis, may require only access on the part of the 
government and some other key players. 
As if the wide-ranging benefits that machine learning and artificial 
intelligence have provided to developing countries were not appealing 
enough, efforts to bridge the algorithmic divide in developing countries 
can generate three types of collateral benefits to developed countries. 
First, commentators have widely noted the network effects generated by 
the increased global use of information and communication technology,72 
which will create economy of both scale and scope. Second, as Mark 
Cooper observed in relation to Internet usage: “As the customer and 
geographic base spreads, the load on the system can be balanced, 
achieving higher overall utilization rates. Spreading the customer base 
across geographic areas would allow time zone differences to balance the 
load as well.”73 The same would apply to machine learning and artificial 
intelligence, especially regarding those algorithm-driven artificial 
intelligence systems that are usable in both developed and developing 
countries. Finally, because big-data analytics are increasingly deployed 
 
 70. Zhuangfang NaNa Yi, Accurate Machine Learning in Data-Sparse Environments, 
MEDIUM (Apr. 4, 2019), https://medium.com/devseed/accurate-machine-learning-in-data-sparse-
environments-afad1101a928 [https://perma.cc/2Z9E-YZ5T]. 
 71. Thanks to Chris Drahozal for pushing me on this point. 
 72. As Mark Cooper observed: 
At the core of the [digital-transformation] process is a virtuous circle that 
uniquely affects these industries. Improvements in computers and software can 
be used to produce further improvements in computers and software. Network 
effects mean that as more people use these products, the products become more 
valuable to each user, stimulating more people to join the network and use it 
more intensely. 
Mark N. Cooper, Inequality in the Digital Society: Why the Digital Divide Deserves All the 
Attention It Gets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 73 (2002). 
 73. Id. at 84–85. 
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in algorithm-enhanced technological products and services, having 
comprehensive datasets that include individuals on both sides of the 
algorithmic divide is imperative.74 As Woodrow Hartzog wrote 
succinctly, “In the world of big data, more is always better.”75 
To be sure, the introduction of algorithm-enhanced technological 
products and services could lead to the problems of algorithmic 
discrimination and distortion, both of which the next two Sections will 
discuss in greater detail.76 When introduced without much consideration 
of local contexts, these products and services could also generate 
unintended consequences.77 As Chinmayi Arun lamented: 
Ideas of the past like one laptop per child have resulted in 
spectacular failure despite the bright-eyed optimism and 
laudable intentions with which they were created. 
Technology designed out of context may fail to take local 
resources, social norms and cultural context into account. 
“One day delivery” can mean very different things in Boston 
and Hyderabad even if the system designed for both cities is 
the same. Facebook can be fairly harmless in most countries 
and find itself weaponised in a country with Myanmar’s 
socio-political context, to contribute to genocide. It can take 
effort for Google Maps to be able to account for the favelas 
of Rio de Janeiro.78 
Notwithstanding the different problems that algorithm-enhanced 
technological products and services may generate, the many promises 
these technologies provide suggest that individuals will be, on balance, 
better off having the technologies than not having them in the first 
place.79 In fact, the sooner those on the unfortunate side of the algorithmic 
 
 74. See discussion infra Section II.C (discussing algorithmic distortion). 
 75. WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 51 (2018); see also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG 
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 100 (2013) 
(“[I]n the age of big data, all data will be regarded as valuable, in and of itself.”). 
 76. See discussion infra Sections II.B, II.C (discussing algorithmic discrimination and 
distortion). 
 77. See generally Chinmayi Arun, AI and the Global South: Designing for Other Worlds, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS OF AI (Markus D. Dubber et al. eds., forthcoming 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403010 [https://perma.cc/WCG7-PU7K] (noting the concerns raised 
by out-of-context design and deployment of artificial intelligence in the global South). 
 78. Id. (manuscript at 3) (footnotes omitted); see also WARSCHAUER, supra note 18, at 65–
69 (discussing Brazil’s People’s Computer and India’s simputer). 
 79. In their book, Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger underscored the concern about the 
techno-social engineering of humans and called for “the freedom to be off, to be free from techno-
social engineering, to live and develop within underdetermined techno-social environments.” 
FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 25, at 269. While they made a convincing case about the 
need for this freedom, there is no freedom to speak of if those on the unfortunate side of the 
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divide can participate in the artificial intelligence revolution, the more 
quickly they will be able to begin shaping the new technological 
environment.80 Such shaping, and reshaping, will make the environment 
more appealing and relevant to them in the long run. 
Moreover, whether these products and services are beneficial or 
harmful will largely depend on the design and use of the algorithms 
involved. To help ensure proper design and usage, Part III will outline 
select remedial actions that implicate ethics, transparency, accountability, 
and competition.81 As that discussion will show, solutions can be 
developed to maximize the benefits of algorithm-enhanced technological 
products and services while minimizing their shortcomings. 
Finally, regardless of whether those on the unfortunate side of the 
algorithmic divide can secure ready and affordable access to these 
products and services, those on the other side of the divide will still 
actively deploy them. Such deployment will harm the technology poor by 
accelerating job displacement82 while widening the gap between the 
technology haves and have-nots.83 Given the sad reality that society 
 
algorithmic divide are forced to be off. Only after their services have been turned on can they 
have “the freedom to be off.” 
 80. Manuel Castells lamented the impact of the digital divide on the Internet: 
The fact that the rise of the Internet took place in conditions of social 
inequality in access everywhere may have lasting consequences on the structure 
and content of the medium . . . . This is because users shape the Internet to an 
even greater extent than any other technology because of the speed of 
transmission of their feedback, and the flexibility of the technology. Thus, first 
users may have shaped the Internet for the latecomers, both in terms of content 
and of technology, in the same way that the pioneers of the Internet shaped the 
technology for the masses of users in the 1990s. 
MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNET, BUSINESS, AND 
SOCIETY 255 (2001). 
 81. See discussion infra Sections III.C, III.D, III.E, III.F (proposing remedial actions 
relating to ethics, transparency, accountability, and competition). 
 82. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE 
ECONOMY 35 (2016) (“Job displacement is likely to be one of the most serious negative 
consequences of AI-driven automation, impacting entire industries and communities.”); RAINIE 
& ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 70–73 (surveying views on the rise of unemployment); Hamann, 
supra note 8 (listing “worsening unemployment” as one of the key risks of technological advances 
associated with artificial intelligence). As far as job displacement is concerned, the level of 
displacement by machine learning and artificial intelligence will likely vary from sector to sector 
and from country to country. See generally ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE 
SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT 
TECHNOLOGIES (2014) (examining the transformative impacts of emerging digital technologies on 
jobs and the economy); Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and 
Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254 (2018) (advancing reforms to address the future impact of 
automation on jobs). 
 83. See Hamann, supra note 8 (listing “increasing concentration of economic power and 
wealth” as another key risk of technological advances associated with artificial intelligence). 
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cannot easily shelter the technology poor from the actions of the 
technology rich—whether in developed or developing countries—
facilitating greater use of algorithm-enhanced technological products and 
services is, to a large extent, a choice that everybody has to embrace. This 
choice is similar to how individuals needed to adapt to the Internet in the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s despite the medium’s many documented 
shortcomings.84 
B.  Algorithmic Discrimination 
In the past few years, commentators have highlighted the different 
problems caused by algorithms, which range from errors to biases and 
from discrimination to dehumanization.85 While Frank Pasquale 
lamented how we now live in a “Black Box Society,”86 Cathy O’Neil 
referred to machine-learning algorithms as “Weapons of Math 
Destruction.”87 
In February 2017, the Pew Research Center and the Imagining the 
Internet Center at Elon University released their joint study, canvassing 
more than 1000 “technology experts, scholars, corporate practitioners 
and government leaders” for their views on the pros and cons of the 
algorithmic age.88 Opening that report is a list containing some widely 
reported problems generated by seemingly out-of-whack algorithms: 
• The British pound dropped 6.1% in value in seconds 
on Oct. 7, 2016, partly because of currency trades 
triggered by algorithms. 
• Microsoft engineers created a Twitter bot named 
“Tay” . . . in an attempt to chat with Millennials by 
 
 84. See NORRIS, supra note 13, at 68 (“The chief concern about the digital divide is that the 
underclass of info-poor may become further marginalized in societies where basic computer skills 
are becoming essential for economic success and personal advancement, entry to good career and 
educational opportunities, full access to social networks, and opportunities for civic 
engagement.”); FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV, supra note 17, at 89 (“We are approaching the 
point where not having access to [computers and the Internet] is likely to put an individual at a 
competitive disadvantage and in a position of being a less-than-full participant in the digital 
economy.”); Yu, supra note 7, at 16–17 (“Information technology is no longer a luxury, but a 
development tool and a critical means of information exchange in the New Economy.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 28, 40. In addition to discrimination, Jack Balkin 
identified the following algorithmic harms: (1) harms to reputation; (2) normalization or 
regimentation; (3) manipulation; and (4) lack of due process, transparency, or interpretability. 
Balkin, supra note 12, at 1238–39. 
 86. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL 
MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
 87. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (Broadway Books 2017) (2016). 
 88. RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 4. 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/4
2020] THE ALGORITHMIC DIVIDE AND EQUALITY IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 355 
 
responding to their prompts, but within hours it was 
spouting racist, sexist, Holocaust-denying tweets 
based on algorithms that had it “learning” how to 
respond to others based on what was tweeted at it. 
• Facebook tried to create a feature to highlight 
Trending Topics from around the site in people’s 
feeds. First, it had a team of humans edit the feature, 
but controversy erupted when some accused the 
platform of being biased against conservatives. So, 
Facebook then turned the job over to algorithms only 
to find that they could not discern real news from 
fake news.89 
As if these examples were not disturbing enough, in 2015, Google 
“publicly apologize[d] after its object recognition algorithm tagged two 
black users of Google Photo as ‘gorillas.’”90 Likewise, “Hewlett-Packard 
(HP) suffered a serious public relations crisis when it was revealed that 
its implementation of what was probably a bottom-up feature-based face 
localization algorithm did not detect Black people as having a face,” due 
largely to the fact that the “[c]ameras on new HP computers did not track 
the faces of Black people in some common lighting conditions.”91 In a 
speech, Ben Bernanke also relayed a story about how his request to 
refinance a mortgage had been denied shortly after stepping down from 
being the chair of the Federal Reserve.92 As a New York Times report 
explained, “[I]n the thoroughly automated world of mortgage finance, 
having recently changed jobs makes [him] a steeper credit risk.”93 
Taken together, these examples show that algorithms can be error 
prone, biased, or both. While algorithmic errors affect everybody having 
access to algorithm-enhanced technological products and services, 
algorithmic bias is particularly problematic for those on the unfortunate 
side of the algorithmic divide. Indeed, many commentators fear that 
algorithmic bias will have a disproportionate impact on the poor, the 
disadvantaged, and the vulnerable.94 
 
 89. Id. at 2–3. 
 90. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: Challenges of Ethical Algorithmic 
Decision-Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 154 (2017). 
 91. Christian Sandvig et al., When the Algorithm Itself Is a Racist: Diagnosing Ethical 
Harm in the Basic Components of Software, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 4972, 4973 (2016) (citations 
omitted). 
 92. Neil Irwin, Why Ben Bernanke Can’t Refinance His Mortgage, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/upshot/why-ben-bernanke-cant-refinance-
his-mortgage.html [https://perma.cc/F64T-QDXZ]. 
 93. Id. 
 94. As Cathy O’Neil explained: 
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Although algorithmic bias can be introduced intentionally through 
overt discriminatory practices,95 most of the time biases enter algorithms 
through covert actions—whether intentional or not.96 First, biases can 
enter algorithms through what commentators have referred to as 
“masking.”97 By utilizing complex algorithms, algorithm designers or 
 
[Algorithm-driven weapons of math destruction] tend to punish the poor. This is, 
in part, because they are engineered to evaluate large numbers of people. They 
specialize in bulk, and they’re cheap. That’s part of their appeal. The wealthy, 
by contrast, often benefit from personal input. A white-shoe law firm or an 
exclusive prep school will lean far more on recommendations and face-to-face 
interviews than will a fast-food chain or a cash-strapped urban school district. 
The privileged, we’ll see time and again, are processed more by people, the 
masses by machines. 
O’NEIL, supra note 87, at 8; see also EUBANKS, supra note 2, at 12 (“Automated decision-making 
shatters the social safety net, criminalizes the poor, intensifies discrimination, and compromises 
our deepest national values.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 63–65 (surveying views on 
whether the disadvantaged will lag behind even further in this algorithmic age). 
 95. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 682 (2017) 
(“A prejudiced decisionmaker could skew the training data or pick proxies for protected classes 
with the intent of generating discriminatory results.”). 
 96. Anupam Chander noted the unlikelihood of overt discrimination on the part of 
algorithm designers: 
First, because much of societal discrimination is subconscious or 
unconscious, it is less likely to be encoded into automated algorithms than the 
human decisionmakers that the algorithms replace. . . . 
. . . . 
Second, even for programmers or companies who intend to discriminate, the 
process of coding itself is likely to cause programmers to shy away from actually 
encoding the discrimination. Even absent compelled disclosure through 
litigation, there is the danger that a hard-coded discrimination will be revealed 
later by hackers or by insiders disgusted by the discrimination. Moreover, 
because code writing is likely to involve teams of programmers sharing code, 
with different persons reviewing and debugging code, consciously coding 
discrimination will likely require obtaining the cooperation of multiple persons, 
which is likely to be a fraught task. 
Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1028–29 (2017) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 97. For discussions of the masking of discriminatory practices, see generally Barocas & 
Selbst, supra note 40, at 712–14; Huq, supra note 40, at 1089–90; Zarsky, supra note 40, at 1389–
90. For illustrative purposes, “a system forbidden to use race as a variable might use other data, 
such as media consumption or purchases of hair care products, to infer race and adjust the offered 
pricing or services accordingly, and it might use factors that themselves reflect preexisting 
patterns of discrimination, such as lower scores on standardized tests or longer commuting 
distances to the site of a new job, as decision-making proxies.” JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH 
AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 247 (2019). 
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their employers can mask discriminatory practices.98 As Aziz Huq 
showed, masked discrimination in algorithmic design can be very 
difficult to prove: 
A discriminatory algorithm designer will leverage such 
knowledge to fashion instruments that yield the disparate 
racial effects they believe to be warranted a priori. Without 
knowing the full spectrum of features that could, 
conceivably, have been included in the training data—which 
can be “enormous”—it will be difficult or impossible to 
diagnose this kind of conduct absent direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent. It will, moreover, be especially 
difficult to show that, but for race, a specific feature would 
or would not have been included, as the doctrine requires. A 
basic principle of “feature selection” instructs that one 
should keep the important features and discard the 
unimportant ones. To the extent that masking occurs, 
therefore, it seems clear that the litigation process would 
rarely yield evidence of such intentional manipulation of the 
algorithm’s design.99 
Second, implicit biases can enter algorithms in two ways. First, these 
biases can originate from algorithm designers who are neutral or well-
intentioned, or who genuinely care about those on the unfortunate side of 
the algorithmic divide.100 Second, the algorithms can rely on problematic 
 
 98. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 90, at 167 (“The profound capability of computers 
to identify patterns in endless piles of unstructured data facilitates the masking of illegitimate 
discrimination behind mirrors and proxies. Decision-making, automated or not, based on such 
criteria should be banned.” (footnote omitted)); Nicholas Diakopoulos et al., Principles for 
Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for Algorithms, FAT/ML, 
https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms [https://perma.cc/W8XL-
P3UK] (“‘The algorithm did it’ is not an acceptable excuse if algorithmic systems make mistakes 
or have undesired consequences, including from machine-learning processes.” (emphasis 
omitted)); see also Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair, 66 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 35 (2013), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 
3/2016/08/DworkMullliganSLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/996Z-XVWW] (“While many companies 
and government agencies foster an illusion that classification is (or should be) an area of absolute 
algorithmic rule—that decisions are neutral, organic, and even automatically rendered without 
human intervention—reality is a far messier mix of technical and human curating.”). 
 99. Huq, supra note 40, at 1089–90 (footnotes omitted); see also Barocas & Selbst, supra 
note 40, at 712–14 (discussing the problem of masking and the related difficulty in proving 
disparate treatment). 
 100. Kate Crawford described this problem as artificial intelligence’s “white guy problem”: 
Like all technologies before it, artificial intelligence will reflect the values 
of its creators. So inclusivity matters—from who designs it to who sits on the 
company boards and which ethical perspectives are included. Otherwise, we risk 
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historical online101 or offline data.102 With inappropriate data fed as either 
input or training data,103 these algorithms will be caught in so-called 
 
constructing machine intelligence that mirrors a narrow and privileged vision of 
society, with its old, familiar biases and stereotypes. 
Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem 
.html [https://perma.cc/8N73-MW2J]; see also RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 12 (“The 
algorithms will be primarily designed by white and Asian men—with data selected by these same 
privileged actors—for the benefit of consumers like themselves.” (quoting Justin Reich, Exec. 
Dir., MIT Teaching Sys. Lab)); Katyal, supra note 2, at 59 (“[A]lgorithmic models are . . . the 
product of their fallible creators, who may miss evidence of systemic bias or structural 
discrimination in data or may simply make mistakes. These errors of omission—innocent by 
nature—risk reifying past prejudices, thereby reproducing an image of an infinitely unjust world.” 
(footnote omitted)); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Silicon Ceilings: Information Technology Equity, the 
Digital Divide and the Gender Gap Among Information Technology Professionals, 2 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 35, 55 (2003) (“Software reflects the biases of its creators, and tends to be biased 
in favor of what are perceived by many to be boys’ interests.” (footnote omitted)); Hamann, supra 
note 8 (lamenting how “AI algorithms are developed almost entirely in developed regions” and 
“may not sufficiently reflect the contexts and priorities of developing countries”); Mariya Yao, 
Fighting Algorithmic Bias and Homogenous Thinking in A.I., FORBES (May 1, 2017, 12:02 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mariyayao/2017/05/01/dangers-algorithmic-bias-homogenous-
thinking-ai [https://perma.cc/ZRW4-9DG2] (“When Timnit Gebru attended a prestigious AI 
research conference last year, she counted 6 black people in the audience out of an estimated 
8,500. And only one black woman: herself.”). 
 101. As Nizan Packin and Yafit Lev-Aretz observed: 
It is questionable how accurate and reliable Internet sources truly are. 
Especially, as they are prone to data cleaning processes—a phenomenon that is 
more typical in the case of social media data—as well as other types of outages, 
random errors and gaps. The cleaning processes, errors, and outages raise 
questions as to whether Internet sources and online data can represent an 
objective truth or is any interpretation necessarily biased by some subjective 
filter given the way that data is cleaned. Similarly, data loss, another frequent 
occurrence, refers to the situation when information is destroyed by failures or 
neglect in storage, transmission, or processing. Originating in Internet sources, 
such errors, outages, and losses in large datasets are amplified when multiple 
datasets are pulled together. 
Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 40, at 91. 
 102. See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of 
Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 349 (2019) (“The question of whether an algorithm can achieve the 
objective of the law turns on the quality of the data that a lawmaker relies on.”); Katyal, supra 
note 2, at 79 (“[W]hen algorithms train on imperfect data, or are designed by individuals who may 
be unconsciously biased in some manner, the results often reflect these biases, often to the 
detriment of certain groups.”); Kim, supra note 40, at 861 (“Algorithms that are built on 
inaccurate, biased, or unrepresentative data can in turn produce outcomes biased along lines of 
race, sex, or other protected characteristics.”); Zarsky, supra note 40, at 1392–94 (discussing the 
reliance on tainted datasets and data collection methods). 
 103. Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb distinguished between three types of 
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“garbage in, garbage out” situations, causing the outcomes to be biased 
against the excluded populations.104 
While the existence of algorithmic bias alone is bad enough, the 
problem can be exacerbated by the fact that machines learn themselves 
by feeding the newly generated data back into the algorithms. Because 
these data will become the new training and feedback data, algorithms 
that are improperly designed or that utilize problematic data could 
amplify real-world biases by creating self-reinforced feedback loops.105 
As time passes, the biases generated through these loops will become 
much worse than the biases found in the original algorithmic designs or 
the initial training data. 
C.  Algorithmic Distortion 
The first two problems—algorithmic deprivation and 
discrimination—affect primarily those on the unfortunate side of the 
algorithmic divide. By contrast, the third problem—the distortion created 
by improperly designed algorithms or a lack of appropriate data—affects 
all users that rely on algorithms to develop policies or to understand, 
manage, or improve the world. 
For instance, when machine-learning algorithms are used to predict 
economic developments at the national or global level, such algorithms 
are unlikely to produce accurate analyses if the training data exclude 
 
data that enter artificial intelligence systems: “Input data is used to power [the machine] to 
produce predictions. Feedback data is used to improve it. . . . Training data is used at the 
beginning to train an algorithm, but once the prediction machine is running, it is not useful 
anymore.” AJAY AGRAWAL ET AL., PREDICTION MACHINES: THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 163 (2018). 
 104. See Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and Its Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 
111, 157 (defining the “garbage in, garbage out” situation as one “in which incorrect input ends 
up producing faulty output”). 
 105. As Ronald Yu and Gabriele Spina Alì observed: 
[T]here is a strong risk that AI may reiterate and even amplify the biases and 
flaws in datasets, even when these are unknown to humans. In this sense, AI has 
a self-reinforcing nature, due to the fact that the machine’s outputs will be used 
as data for future algorithmic operations. 
Ronald Yu & Gabriele Spina Alì, What’s Inside the Black Box? AI Challenges for Lawyers and 
Researchers, 19 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 2, 4 (2019); see also Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges 
in the Age of Big Data, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803, 827 (2017) 
(“[A]lgorithmic self-reinforcing loops are now present across many spheres of our daily life (e.g., 
retail contexts, career contexts, credit decisions, insurance, Google search results, news 
feeds) . . . .”); Katyal, supra note 2, at 69 (“Bad data . . . can perpetuate inequalities through 
machine learning, leading to a feedback loop that replicates existing forms of bias, potentially 
impacting minorities as a result.”); Digital Decisions, supra note 46 (“Unreliable or unfair 
decisions that go unchallenged can contribute to bad feedback loops, which can make algorithms 
even more likely to marginalize vulnerable populations.”). 
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those on the unfortunate side of the algorithmic divide, which make up a 
large segment of the population. Because biases in machine-generated 
analyses can amplify themselves by feeding these biases into future 
analyses, the unreliability of those analyses that omit data from the 
unfortunate side of the algorithmic divide will increase over time. Such 
analyses will eventually become much more unreliable than the initial 
skewing caused by a lack of training data concerning that unfortunate 
side. 
At the global level, analyses that omit data from the technology poor 
will become even more problematic. Oftentimes, big-data analytics, 
machine learning, and artificial intelligence are deployed to address 
global problems—be they reduction of poverty, improvement on public 
health, enhancement on basic education, or relief to climate change.106 In 
the area of climate change, for example, machine learning and artificial 
intelligence have been actively utilized to track natural disasters,107 
highlight alarming trends, and prevent man-made environmental 
damage.108 Without the inclusion of information from the world’s most 
vulnerable populations that are on the unfortunate side of the algorithmic 
divide, any algorithmically generated analyses will likely be of limited or 
no use to addressing these problems. 
To be sure, in terms of the scope of the problem and the severity of its 
impact, the problem of algorithmic distortion is no comparison to the 
problem of algorithmic deprivation or discrimination. Nevertheless, in 
terms of the scale of that impact, such distortion can be quite damaging, 
as algorithmic distortion will prevent all users—on both sides of the 
divide—from realizing the full potential of machine learning and 
artificial intelligence. 
Given the strong likelihood that the algorithmic divide will continue 
to distort outcomes generated by algorithms, it is worth exploring when 
such distortion warrants human intervention.109 Anthony Casey and 
Anthony Niblett, for instance, noted the continuous role of humans in 
algorithmic development: 
 
 106. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 107. See Maskey, supra note 53 (noting the artificial intelligence program that “accurately 
predicts seismic events and is . . . working on solutions for floods, wildfires and hurricanes”). 
 108. See De-Arteaga et al., supra note 30, at 9:4 (“[V]iolence in the developing world often 
occurs in difficult to access rural areas. In order to prevent such atrocities, ‘crisis mapping’ 
provides spatio-temporal analyses of . . . environmental disasters.” (quoting Jen Ziemke, Crisis 
Mapping: The Construction of a New Interdisciplinary Field?, 8 J. MAP & GEOGRAPHY LIBR. 101, 
101 (2012))). 
 109. Article 22(3) of the EU General Data Protection Regulation requires a data controller 
to “implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and 
legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to 
express his or her point of view and to contest [a decision based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling].” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 22(3), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 46. 
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Algorithmic decision-making does not mean that humans 
are shut out of the process. Even after the objective has been 
set, there is much human work to be done. Indeed, humans 
are involved in all stages of setting up, training, coding, and 
assessing the merits of the algorithm. If the objectives of the 
algorithm and the objective of the law are perfectly aligned 
at the ex ante stage, one must ask: Under what circumstances 
should a human ignore the algorithm’s suggestions and 
intervene after the algorithm has made the decision?110 
Notwithstanding the need for and benefit of human intervention or 
“supervision,”111 deciding when humans should intervene is not always 
easy. As Professors Casey and Niblett continued: 
Algorithms will often identify counterintuitive connections 
that may appear erroneous to humans even when accurate. 
Humans should be careful in those cases not to undo the very 
value that was added by the algorithm’s ability to recognize 
these connections. This is especially true when the benefit of 
the algorithm was that it reduced human bias and behavioral 
errors.112 
III.  SOLUTIONS 
The previous Part identified three distinct problems, each of which 
may call for the development of different solutions. Yet, these problems 
overlap to some extent and at times may warrant common solutions. To 
help bridge the algorithmic divide, this Part proposes seven non-
 
 110. Casey & Niblett, supra note 102, at 354. 
 111. Machine learning can generally be separated into supervised and unsupervised learning, 
with the latter having no predefined output. See generally ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: 
THE NEW AI 38–42, 111–18 (2016) (discussing supervised and unsupervised learning); 
KELLEHER, supra note 35, at 26–30 (discussing supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement 
learning). Supervision, in this case, will be to set parameters for the algorithmic operation or to 
add predefined outputs to constrain that operation. Although unsupervised learning has become 
increasingly attractive, due to its unlimited potential, most artificial intelligence systems combine 
supervised- and unsupervised-learning techniques. See generally David Lehr & Paul Ohm, 
Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 653 (2017) (providing an accessible overview of machine learning for lawyers). 
 112. Casey & Niblett, supra note 102, at 354; see also RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, 
at 40 (“People often confuse a biased algorithm for an algorithm that doesn’t confirm their biases. 
If Facebook shows more liberal stories than conservative, that doesn’t mean something is wrong. 
It could be a reflection of their user base, or of their media sources, or just random chance.” 
(quoting an anonymous principal of a consulting firm)); Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, 
Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 158 
(2016) (“[I]t is not uncommon for pilots in the cockpit to be surprised or confused by an automated 
activity undertaken by an autopilot system.”). See generally Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, 
The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018) (documenting 
the limitations of intuition while noting the need to address inscrutability). 
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exhaustive clusters of remedial actions. Featuring law, communications 
policy, ethical principles, institutional mechanisms, and business 
practices, the wide variety of actions proposed in this Part aim to fashion 
a holistic response to the multidimensional problems precipitated by the 
algorithmic divide. 
A.  Literacy 
From the individuals’ lack of awareness of algorithm-related 
problems to their inability to adapt to machine learning and artificial 
intelligence,113 increasing algorithmic literacy is crucial if a large 
majority of the world’s population is to reap the benefits of these new 
technologies.114 These individuals will need to know not only the impact 
of machine learning and artificial intelligence on their daily lives but also 
what it means to live in a society driven heavily by algorithms and 
intelligent machines.115 Greater algorithmic literacy will help these 
 
 113. See discussion supra Sections I.A, I.E, II.B (discussing the need for awareness of and 
adaptability to machine learning and artificial intelligence and the problem of algorithmic 
discrimination). 
 114. See INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 14, at 142 (“Improving digital literacy of 
citizens should be a high priority for the government and other organizations.”); PAUL ET AL., 
supra note 45, at 74 (“Strengthening training programs for data science and machine learning in 
local development contexts can help create a pipeline of individuals who are ‘bilingual’ in the 
sense of understanding local context and having the technical skills to take an active role in 
developing [machine-learning] tools.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 74–76 (surveying 
views on the need for algorithmic literacy); UNESCO, supra note 64, at 6–7 (“[T]eachers must 
learn new digital skills to use AI in a pedagogical and meaningful way . . . .”); id. at 29 
(identifying the new competencies needed by teachers to make more effective use of artificial 
intelligence-enabled technologies); see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 82, at 32 
(noting the need to “build[] on the President’s Computer Science for All initiative, which seeks to 
give all students at the K–12 level access to coursework in computing and computational 
thinking”). 
 115. The International Society for Technology in Education and the Computer Science 
Teachers Association provided the following operational definition of computational thinking: 
Computational thinking (CT) is a problem-solving process that includes (but is 
not limited to) the following characteristics: 
• Formulating problems in a way that enables us to use a computer and 
other tools to help solve them[] 
• Logically organizing and analyzing data 
• Representing data through abstractions such as models and simulations 
• Automating solutions through algorithmic thinking (a series of ordered 
steps) 
• Identifying, analyzing, and implementing possible solutions with the 
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individuals realize the full potential of machine learning and artificial 
intelligence. It will also assist them in choosing away from undesirable 
technological products and services that fail to protect privacy or other 
individual rights. 
In addition, a greater understanding of algorithmic operations will 
allow individuals to develop human-generated responses to ensure more 
successful engagement with algorithm-enhanced technological products 
and services and the rapidly changing technological environment. While 
most of these individuals are unlikely to be able to fully understand the 
operation of the algorithms involved116—or, in some cases, no individual 
will ever be able to develop such a full understanding—research has 
shown that individuals are capable of developing responses that would 
 
goal of achieving the most efficient and effective combination of steps 
and resources 
• Generalizing and transferring this problem solving process to a wide 
variety of problems[.] 
INT’L SOC’Y FOR TECH. IN EDUC. & COMPUT. SCI. TEACHERS ASS’N, OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF 
COMPUTATIONAL THINKING FOR K–12 EDUCATION (n.d.), https://id.iste.org/docs/ct-documents/ 
computational-thinking-operational-definition-flyer.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/5M9N-SBL2]; 
see also RAGNEDDA, supra note 18, at 101 (“Digital literacy . . . should not be confused with 
technological skills; rather, it is an umbrella term that includes several skills, including: 
information-finding skills; Internet skills; effective communication skills; functional skills; 
collaboration skills; creative skills; shared knowledge; critical-thinking skills; social-networking 
skills; career skills; and identity management skills.”); WARSCHAUER, supra note 18, at 113 
(“Information literacies involve both computer-specific knowledge (e.g., mastery of browsing 
software and search tools) and broader critical literacy skills (e.g., analysis and evaluation of 
information sources).”). See generally PETER J. DENNING & MATTI TEDRE, COMPUTATIONAL 
THINKING (2019) (providing an overview of computational thinking). 
 116. As Pedro Domingos lamented: 
When algorithms become too intricate for our poor human brains to understand, 
when the interactions between different parts of the algorithm are too many and 
too involved, errors creep in, we can’t find them and fix them, and the algorithm 
doesn’t do what we want. Even if we somehow make it work, it winds up being 
needlessly complicated for the people using it and doesn’t play well with other 
algorithms, storing up trouble for later. 
DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 5; see also EUBANKS, supra note 2, at 184–85 (“The software, 
algorithms, and models that power [the algorithm-driven digital poorhouse] are complex and often 
secret.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 19 (“Only the programmers are in a position to 
know for sure what the algorithm does, and even they might not be clear about what’s going on. 
In some cases there is no way to tell exactly why or how a decision by an algorithm is reached.” 
(quoting Doc Searls, Dir., Project VRM, Berkman Klein Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Harvard 
Univ.)); Chander, supra note 96, at 1040 (“[T]he algorithm may be too complicated for many 
others to understand, or even if it is understandable, too demanding, timewise, to comprehend 
fully.”); Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 638 (“The source code of computer systems is illegible to 
nonexperts. In fact, even experts often struggle to understand what software code will do, as 
inspecting source code is a very limited way of predicting how a computer program will behave.”). 
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“trick” algorithms into providing more desirable results.117 Facebook 
users, for example, have provided different information to improve 
algorithmic outcomes.118 Research has also shown that users change their 
behaviors in response to undesirable outcomes.119 Having strong 
algorithmic literacy will therefore be crucial to making adjustments in 
this new technological environment. 
Finally, as policy makers and commentators have widely noted, the 
age of artificial intelligence will result in massive job losses,120 especially 
in developing countries.121 If individuals are to successfully transition to 
 
 117. The ability to manipulate results or game the system is often used to justify the 
nondisclosure of algorithms. See Chander, supra note 96, at 1040 (“[T]ransparency invites 
manipulations by those who game those algorithms.”); Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 639 (“The 
process for deciding which tax returns to audit, or whom to pull aside for secondary security 
screening at the airport, may need to be partly opaque to prevent tax cheats or terrorists from 
gaming the system.”). 
 118. See Caleb Garling, Tricking Facebook’s Algorithm, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/tricking-facebooks-algorithm/375801/ 
[https://perma.cc/8BKJ-56WQ] (discussing the experience of tricking Facebook to elevate the 
author’s post); Susarla, supra note 10 (“A study of Facebook usage found that when participants 
were made aware of Facebook’s algorithm for curating news feeds, about 83% of participants 
modified their behavior to try to take advantage of the algorithm, while around 10% decreased 
their usage of Facebook.”); see also Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2018) (listing avoidance, altered conduct, altered input, and 
obfuscation among the dominant gaming strategies deployed by users on Internet platforms). 
 119. See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 295 (2019) (“Audiences 
will inevitably alter their behavior under the influence of the algorithms they depend on, and these 
behavioral changes then impact the data and data relationships that form the inputs to the same 
algorithms, a mirrored parallel to the cycles of anticipation in design.”); see also Gillespie, supra 
note 2, at 183–88 (discussing the algorithms’ entanglement with user behavior); Peter K. Yu, Can 
Algorithms Promote Fair Use?, 14 FIU L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4–5), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403712 [https://perma.cc/QYY9-PSKE] (discussing the potential 
changes in creative choices and practices when algorithms are deployed to promote fair use in 
copyright law). 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 82 (discussing how machine learning and artificial 
intelligence would displace jobs). 
 121. As Lee Kai-fu observed: 
AI-driven automation in factories will undercut the one economic advantage 
developing countries historically possessed: cheap labor. Robot-operated 
factories will likely relocate to be closer to their customers in large markets, 
pulling away the ladder that developing countries like China and the “Asian 
Tigers” of South Korea and Singapore climbed up on their way to becoming 
high-income, technology-driven economies. The gap between global haves and 
have-nots will widen, with no known path toward closing it. 
LEE, supra note 6, at 20–21. Similarly, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers noted 
the following in its draft guiding document: 
The risk of unemployment for developing countries is more serious than for 
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this new technological environment, they will need to acquire a high level 
of algorithmic literacy. To a large extent, the lack of such literacy will 
harm individuals the same way as the lack of computing or Internet-
related skills at the turn of this millennium, or even today.122 In the age 
of artificial intelligence, policy makers should be well prepared to train, 
and retrain, a large portion of their constituents to better adapt to the new 
technological demands and challenges. 
B.  Amelioration 
Just like how the changing technological environment could affect an 
individual’s career opportunities, policy makers can easily anticipate and 
sufficiently ameliorate the problems of algorithmic deprivation and 
algorithmic discrimination. Not only will these policy makers need to 
better understand the changing technological environment—through the 
literacy-based solutions discussed above123—but they will also need to 
take proactive actions to preempt or quickly address problems that the 
algorithmic divide will precipitate. Successful responses to these 
problems will generate algorithmic opportunities that will allow their 
constituencies to fully participate in the artificial intelligence 
revolution.124 
Ameliorating algorithmic deprivation will require laws and policies 
that facilitate greater technology diffusion to those in need. To a large 
extent, the laws and policies needed in this area resemble those that were 
 
developed countries. The industry of most developing countries is labor 
intensive. While labor may be cheap(er) in developing economies, the ripple 
effects will be felt much more than in the developed economies as more and more 
jobs will be gradually replaced along with the development of robots or 
[autonomous and intelligent systems]. 
INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 14, at 133–34. 
 122. See RAGNEDDA, supra note 18, at 101 (“A lack of basic ability in using computers and 
surfing the net puts individuals in a disadvantaged position.”); see also WARSCHAUER, supra note 
18, at 111–19 (noting the need for computer, information, multimedia, and computer-mediated 
communication literacy); Ali, supra note 33, at 194 (“In today’s global economy, where 
computers and the Internet are so fundamental to production and participation, it is clear that if 
the right to development is to be taken seriously, that right must encompass the development of 
ICT infrastructure and skills.”). 
 123. See discussion supra Section III.A (discussing the need to increase algorithmic literacy). 
 124. Cf. B. Keith Fulton, AOL Time Warner Foundation: Extending Internet Benefits to All, 
20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 181 (2002) (“[W]orld leaders, captains of industry, local 
politicians, community advocates and others have begun to embrace the notion of ‘digital 
opportunity’ as a better way to quickly frame domestic and international efforts to extend the 
benefits of the digital age to all.”); Yu, supra note 7, at 21–22 (discussing the Digital Opportunity 
Taskforce established at the G-8 Summit in Okinawa, Japan, in July 2000). In addition to digital 
opportunity, the term “digital dividend” has also been widely used to refer to the benefits provided 
by digital technology. See, e.g., High-level Panel Report, supra note 32, at 6 (“Digital dividends 
co-exist with digital divides.”). 
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already introduced a decade or two ago to address the digital divide.125 In 
the telecommunications field, for instance, policy makers have relied on 
the introduction of universal service,126 such as the E-rate Program.127 
Some European countries, such as “Estonia, Finland, Greece, and Spain, 
have also mandated universal broadband access or recognized a right to 
broadband services.”128 
To be sure, there is a significant distinction between addressing 
algorithmic deprivation and providing access to the Internet or other basic 
telecommunications services. While the latter requires the provision of 
free or affordable service, the former requires adaptation to a new 
technological environment. Nevertheless, many capabilities relating to 
machine learning and artificial intelligence have already been built into 
easy-to-use technological products and services. For example, it does not 
take much effort or knowledge to figure out how to use the auto-complete 
feature in a software129 or to wait patiently for a self-learning computer 
to provide better results. From that vantage point, facilitating access to 
new algorithm-enhanced technological products and services is quite 
similar to increasing one’s ability to utilize basic telecommunications 
services. 
Compared with efforts to tackle algorithmic deprivation, addressing 
algorithmic discrimination requires different solutions. To begin with, 
policy makers should introduce laws, policies, and institutional 
mechanisms to prevent intentional algorithmic discrimination.130 In the 
workplace, for instance, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964131 
prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
 
 125. See NORRIS, supra note 13, at 10 (identifying the measures taken by the Clinton 
Administration to address the digital divide); VAN DIJK, supra note 13, at 205–17 (outlining the 
concrete measures for closing the digital divide and preventing structural inequality, with a focus 
on motivational, material, skills, and usage access). 
 126. See generally Milton Mueller, Telecommunications Access in the Age of Electronic 
Commerce: Toward a Third-Generation Universal Service Policy, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 655 (1997) 
(discussing the evolution of the universal-service policy in light of the changing demands and 
expectations brought about by electronic commerce). 
 127. See Yu, supra note 7, at 10 n.53 (providing sources discussing the E-rate Program). 
 128. Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1422 (2010) (footnote 
omitted). 
 129. Notwithstanding its benefits, this feature can also cause significant harm to individual 
users. See generally Anne S.Y. Cheung, Defaming by Suggestion: Searching for Search Engine 
Liability in the Autocomplete Era, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 467 (András Koltay ed., 2015) (discussing the defamatory results 
generated by Google’s search algorithm). 
 130. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 90, at 135 (“[A]lgorithms that implement 
discriminatory criteria are unlawful and/or unethical and must be purged.”). 
 131. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–68 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2018)). 
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origin.”132 While commentators have noted the complications caused by 
diverging legal standards and interpretations—such as those addressing 
the difference between “disparate treatments” and “disparate 
impacts”133—the biggest challenge in the age of artificial intelligence will 
likely be the increased ability for those in support of discriminatory 
practices to hide behind algorithms and machines—the masking problem 
mentioned in Section II.B.134 
Equally daunting is to address algorithmic discrimination that neutral 
or well-intentioned efforts have caused. As the previous Part noted, 
algorithm-enhanced technological products and services are often biased 
or discriminatory because they are designed with implicit bias or rely on 
problematic data.135 To address this complication, the next four Sections 
will focus on remedial actions that implicate ethics, transparency, 
accountability, and competition.136 Cumulatively these actions will help 
address such unintentional discriminatory practices and outcomes. 
Finally, addressing algorithmic distortion—and, to an equal extent, 
algorithmic discrimination—requires the development of a more 
inclusive environment.137 Such an environment needs to be diverse not 
only in terms of those designing algorithms and related technological 
products and services but also in terms of the training and feedback data 
that are being fed into the algorithms. The lack of diversity in either 
 
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 133. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 40, at 694–712 (discussing the distinction 
between disparate treatment and disparate impact in the context of big data); Zarsky, supra note 
40, at 1384–1404 (discussing disparate treatment and disparate impact in the context of social-
scoring systems). 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 97–99 (discussing the masking problem). 
 135. See discussion supra Section II.B (discussing algorithmic discrimination). 
 136. See discussion infra Sections III.C, III.D, III.E, III.F (proposing remedial actions 
relating to ethics, transparency, accountability, and competition). 
 137. As Amy Webb, CEO of the Future Today Institute, declared: 
The only way to address algorithmic discrimination in the future is to invest in 
the present. The overwhelming majority of coders are white and male. 
Corporations must do more than publish transparency reports about their staff—
they must actively invest in women and people of color, who will soon be the 
next generation of workers. And when the day comes, they must choose new 
hires both for their skills and their worldview. Universities must redouble their 
efforts not only to recruit a diverse body of students—administrators and faculty 
must support them through to graduation. And not just students. Universities 
must diversify their faculties, to ensure that students see themselves reflected in 
their teachers. 
RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 23 (quoting Amy Webb, Chief Exec. Officer, Future Today 
Inst.); see also MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW COMPUTERS 
MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD 154 (2018) (“Th[e] willful blindness on the part of some technology 
creators is why we need inclusive technology . . . .”). 
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direction will likely perpetuate the many historical biases that originate 
in the offline world. 
To respond to this need for inclusivity, commentators have called for 
policies and practices to facilitate greater inclusion in the new 
technological environment.138 For example, in its final report, the United 
Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation 
underscored the importance of developing “[a]n inclusive digital 
economy and society.”139 Greater emphasis on inclusivity will help move 
society closer to tackling the problems of both algorithmic discrimination 
and algorithmic distortion.140 
C.  Ethics 
As the previous Section noted, well-intentioned efforts can sometimes 
lead to discriminatory outcomes. Efforts in an algorithmic society are no 
different. As a result, policy makers and commentators should devote 
greater time, effort, and energy to developing ethical standards that 
should be built into the design, usage, and improvement of algorithms 
and intelligent machines.141 
To ensure the compliance of high ethical standards, responses should 
be developed both inside and outside the design process. Within the 
process, those involved in algorithmic design should devote greater 
attention to developing best practices or codes of conduct concerning how 
best to avoid or alleviate the problems of algorithmic discrimination and 
distortion.142 Letting designers develop best practices and codes of 
 
 138. See Mark Warschauer, Reconceptualizing the Digital Divide, FIRST MONDAY (July 
1, 2002), https://www.firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/967/888 [https://perma.cc/ 
QX69-E5WW] (“A framework of technology for social inclusion allows us to re-orient the focus 
from that of gaps to be overcome by provision of equipment to that of social development to be 
enhanced through the effective integration of ICT into communities and institutions.”). 
 139. High-level Panel Report, supra note 32, at 29–30. 
 140. See discussion supra Section II.C (discussing algorithmic distortion). 
 141. As the Obama Administration declared in its white paper on artificial intelligence: 
Ethical training for AI practitioners and students is a necessary part of the 
solution. Ideally, every student learning AI, computer science, or data science 
would be exposed to curriculum and discussion on related ethics and security 
topics. However, ethics alone is not sufficient. Ethics can help practitioners 
understand their responsibilities to all stakeholders, but ethical training should 
be augmented with technical tools and methods for putting good intentions into 
practice by doing the technical work needed to prevent unacceptable outcomes. 
COMM. ON TECH., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 3 (2016) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE], https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future
_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/24P5-FKYD]. 
 142. See Katyal, supra note 2, at 108–11 (discussing codes of conduct for designing artificial 
intelligence systems). 
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conduct can be highly effective because they understand the 
technological challenges and are in good positions to anticipate problems 
that improperly designed algorithms and data practices could cause. 
Thus far, there has been a growing push for the development of fair 
and explainable algorithms.143 Pauline Kim explained the benefits of 
“explainability” as follows: 
When a model is interpretable, debate may ensue over 
whether its use is justified, but it is at least possible to have 
a conversation about whether relying on the behaviors or 
attributes that drive the outcomes is normatively acceptable. 
When a model is not interpretable, however, it is not even 
possible to have the conversation.144 
In January 2017, the U.S. Public Policy Council of the authoritative 
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) released its Statement on 
Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability (ACM Statement).145 
Principle 4 states explicitly that “[s]ystems and institutions that use 
algorithmic decision-making are encouraged to produce explanations 
regarding both the procedures followed by the algorithm and the specific 
decisions that are made.”146 Later that year, the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) also released the second draft of its guiding 
document entitled Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing 
Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems.147 Included 
in that document was a recommendation calling on software engineers to 
“document all of their systems and related data flows, their performance, 
limitations, and risks,” with emphases on “auditability, accessibility, 
meaningfulness, and readability.”148 Apart from the ACM and the IEEE, 
every year FAT/ML, which stands for “Fairness, Accountability, and 
Transparency in Machine Learning,” “[brings] together a . . . community 
of researchers and practitioners” with similar interests and concerns.149 
Like the two other organizations, FAT/ML has adopted principles that 
are designed to help make algorithms fair, explainable, ethical, and 
transparent.150 
 
 143. See infra text accompanying notes 179–182. 
 144. Kim, supra note 40, at 922–23. 
 145. ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1. 
 146. Id. at 2; see also Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98 (“Ensure that algorithmic decisions 
as well as any data driving those decisions can be explained to end-users and other stakeholders 
in non-technical terms.”). 
 147. INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 14. 
 148. Id. at 68. 
 149. Fairness, Accountability, & Transparency in Machine Learning, FAT/ML, 
https://www.fatml.org/ [https://perma.cc/2B24-PZ3G]. 
 150. See Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98 (delineating principles laid down by the 
FAT/ML). 
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Even though trusting designers to come up with best practices and 
codes of conduct can be highly promising, there also needs to be external 
responses. At the domestic level, laws should be put in place to ensure 
greater ethical standards in the design and use of algorithms. At the 
international level, treaties,151 soft law recommendations,152 or other 
normative documents can be utilized to help facilitate the development 
of internationally acceptable standards. As consensus emerges at the 
international level, these standards will slowly translate into domestic 
laws and practices. 
 
 151. The area that has caught immediate attention concerns human rights. See INST. ELEC. & 
ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 14, at 22–23 (proposing Principle 1 to ensure that autonomous and 
intelligent systems “do not infringe upon human rights”); PEACOCK, supra note 18, at 108–84 
(discussing the positive human rights obligations to facilitate access to the Internet and the 
possibility of using human rights to provide support for the overall goal of bridging the digital 
divide); Lorna McGregor et al., International Human Rights Law as a Framework for Algorithmic 
Accountability, 68 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 309, 313 (2019) (“[A] human rights-based approach to 
algorithmic accountability offers an organizing framework for the design, development and 
deployment of algorithms . . . .”); Rohinton P. Medhora, AI & Global Governance: Three Paths 
Towards a Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence, UNITED NATIONS U. CTR. POL’Y RES. 
(Oct. 28, 2018), https://cpr.unu.edu/ai-global-governance-three-paths-towards-a-global-
governance-of-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/5TBZ-ZP4A] (“[A]lgorithms should 
be subordinated to the same kind of universal ethics regime that governs human and state 
behavior: something similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”). As Lorna 
McGregor, Daragh Murray, and Vivian Ng elaborated: 
First, [international human rights law] may rule out the use of algorithms in 
certain decision-making processes. Second, it may require modifications or the 
building in of additional safeguards in order to ensure rights compliance and thus 
may create a delay in deployment. Third, it may shift debates on the 
unpredictability of algorithms, particularly in the future where greater autonomy 
is anticipated, from a perceived reduced responsibility to a greater responsibility 
for actors that deploy algorithms in the knowledge that they cannot predict 
effects, including to human rights. While these three findings act as restrictions 
on the use of algorithms, in our view, they constitute appropriate checks and 
balances. They are not intended to be “anti-innovation”. Instead algorithmic 
decision-making is addressed in the same way as human decision-making. The 
objective is to ensure that algorithms contribute to society, while safeguarding 
against risks. 
McGregor et al., supra, at 314–15. 
 152. Target 9.C of U.N. Sustainable Development Goal 9 provides: “Significantly increase 
access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and 
affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020.” G.A. Res. 70/1, 
Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, at 21 (Oct. 21, 2015). 
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D.  Transparency 
Commentators have noted how algorithms have resulted in the 
creation of an inscrutable “black box.”153 In response to this problem, 
Frank Pasquale outlined various legal strategies to provide checks against 
some of the worst “black box” abuses while “mak[ing] the case for a new 
politics and economics of reputation, search, and finance, based on the 
ideal of an intelligible society.”154 Commentators have also noted the 
importance of accountability by design.155 In the privacy area, for 
instance, Woodrow Hartzog advanced “a design agenda for privacy law,” 
explaining why “the design of popular technologies is critical to privacy, 
and the law should take it more seriously.”156 In addition, commentators 
have underscored the need for greater transparency in the design and use 
of algorithms, including the disclosure of technological choices made by 
algorithm designers.157 Some experts and organizations have also called 
 
 153. In his widely cited book, Frank Pasquale noted the dual meaning of the term “black 
box”: “The term ‘black box’ . . . can refer to a recording device, like the data-monitoring systems 
in planes, trains, and cars. Or it can mean a system whose workings are mysterious; we can 
observe its inputs and outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other.” PASQUALE, supra 
note 86, at 3; see also DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at xvi (“When a new technology is as pervasive 
and game changing as machine learning, it’s not wise to let it remain a black box.”); EUBANKS, 
supra note 2, at 5 (“[T]hat’s the thing about being targeted by an algorithm: you get a sense of a 
pattern in the digital noise, an electronic eye turned toward you, but you can’t put your finger on 
exactly what’s amiss.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 19 (“There is a larger problem 
with the increase of algorithm-based outcomes beyond the risk of error or discrimination—the 
increasing opacity of decision-making and the growing lack of human accountability.” (quoting 
Marc Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.)). 
 154. PASQUALE, supra note 86, at 15; see also id. at 140–218 (outlining the legal strategies 
to curb “black box” abuses and calling for the development of “an intelligible society”). 
 155. See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 640 (“[I]n order for a computer system to function 
in an accountable way—either while operating an important civic process or merely engaging in 
routine commerce—accountability must be part of the system’s design from the start.”). 
 156. HARTZOG, supra note 75, at 7. 
 157. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355 
(calling for an open code model to improve the quality and legitimacy of decisions made by 
administrative agencies); Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1183, 1250–79 (2019) (calling for the controlled disclosure of source code). 
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on these designers to provide social impact statements158 or periodic 
assessments.159 
 
 158. As the FAT/ML’s Principles for Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact 
Statement for Algorithms declare: 
In order to ensure their adherence to these principles and to publicly commit 
to associated best practices, we propose that algorithm creators develop a Social 
Impact Statement using the above principles as a guiding structure. This 
statement should be revisited and reassessed (at least) three times during the 
design and development process: 
• design stage, 
• pre-launch, 
• and post-launch. 
When the system is launched, the statement should be made public as a form 
of transparency so that the public has expectations for social impact of the 
system. 
Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98; see also Katyal, supra note 2, at 111–17 (discussing human 
impact statements in the artificial intelligence context); Selbst, supra note 40, 169–82 (advancing 
a regulatory proposal based on the requirement of algorithmic impact statements); Selbst & 
Barocas, supra note 112, at 1134–35 (discussing algorithmic impact statements). 
 159. Article 35(1) of the EU General Data Protection Regulation provides: 
Where a type of processing in particular using new technologies, and taking 
into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely 
to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller 
shall, prior to the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the 
envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data. 
Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 109, art. 35(1); see also INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, 
supra note 14, at 98 (“A system to assess privacy impacts related to [autonomous and intelligent 
systems] needs to be developed, along with best practice recommendations, especially as 
automated decision systems spread into industries that are not traditionally data-rich.”); McGregor 
et al., supra note 151, at 330 (discussing impact assessments in an algorithmic context); 
Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98 (calling for assessment “(at least) three times during the design 
and development process: design stage, pre-launch, and post-launch”). As Lorna McGregor, 
Daragh Murray, and Vivian Ng explained: 
During the design and development stage, impact assessments should evaluate 
how an algorithm is likely to work, ensure that it functions as intended and 
identify any problematic processes or assumptions. This provides an opportunity 
to modify the design of an algorithm at an early stage, to build in human rights 
compliance—including monitoring mechanisms—from the outset, or to halt 
development if human rights concerns cannot be addressed. Impact assessments 
should also be conducted at the deployment stage, in order to monitor effects 
during operation. . . . [T]his requires that, during design and development, the 
focus should not only be on testing but steps should also be taken to build in 
effective oversight and monitoring processes that will be able to identify and 
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While improving transparency in algorithmic design is of paramount 
importance, algorithmic transparency alone does not suffice. As Anupam 
Chander rightly noted, in the age of artificial intelligence, data used in, 
and outcomes generated by, the algorithms should also be transparent.160 
The importance of data transparency is obvious, considering that the 
training and feedback data fed into the algorithms are key ingredients 
sustaining the algorithmic operation. Even if the algorithms used are 
properly designed, the inclusion of problematic data could heavily skew 
the algorithmic outcomes.161 
Indeed, in this age of artificial intelligence, scrutinizing algorithms 
alone may not reveal the full extent of a problem.162 As Kartik Hosanagar 
and Vivian Jair observed: 
[M]achine learning algorithms—and deep learning 
algorithms in particular—are usually built on just a few 
hundred lines of code. The algorithms logic is mostly learned 
from training data and is rarely reflected in its source code. 
Which is to say, some of today’s best-performing algorithms 
are often the most opaque.163 
 
respond to human rights violations once the algorithm is deployed. This ability 
to respond to violations is key as [international human rights law] requires that 
problematic processes must be capable of being reconsidered, revised or 
adjusted. 
McGregor et al., supra note 151, at 330. 
 160. See Chander, supra note 96, at 1024–25 (“What we need instead is a transparency of 
inputs and results, which allows us to see that the algorithm is generating discriminatory 
impact.”); see also O’NEIL, supra note 87, at 229 (“We have to learn to interrogate our data 
collection process, not just our algorithms.”). 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 101–104 (discussing the biases and errors created 
by problematic data). 
 162. See Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 641 (“[W]ithout full transparency—including source 
code, input data, and the full operating environment of the software—even the disclosure of audit 
logs showing what a program did while it was running provides no guarantee that the disclosed 
information actually reflects a computer system’s behavior.”); see also id. at 657–60 (discussing 
the limits to transparency in the algorithmic context). 
 163. Kartik Hosanagar & Vivian Jair, We Need Transparency in Algorithms, but Too Much 
Can Backfire, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/we-need-transparency-
in-algorithms-but-too-much-can-backfire [https://perma.cc/3NVS-FNWP]; see also Daniel 
Gervais, Exploring the Interfaces Between Big Data and Intellectual Property Law, 10 J. INTELL. 
PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 3, 5 (2019) (“[A]ny human contribution to the output 
of deep learning systems is ‘second degree.’”). As a government report on artificial intelligence 
explained: 
Deep learning uses structures loosely inspired by the human brain, consisting of 
a set of units (or “neurons”). Each unit combines a set of input values to produce 
an output value, which in turn is passed on to other neurons downstream. For 
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Thus, in cases involving self-learning algorithms, closely scrutinizing the 
algorithms alone will unlikely provide the information needed to fully 
understand the algorithmic operations.164 Such scrutiny will be even less 
useful when algorithms begin designing new algorithms.165 In those 
scenarios, the related designers’ ability to explain the algorithms involved 
and the related technological choices will be much more limited than their 
ability to explain the choices involved in the original algorithmic designs. 
Like data transparency, the transparency of algorithmic outcomes is 
also very important. Without knowing the outcomes, it will be difficult 
for individual users or outside reviewers to determine the satisfactoriness 
of the algorithms involved. The lack of outcome transparency also harms 
users by reducing their ability to choose away from undesirable products 
and services.166 Such a lack will also make it difficult for policy makers, 
consumer advocates, and the public at large to document the problems in 
 
example, in an image recognition application, a first layer of units might combine 
the raw data of the image to recognize simple patterns in the image; a second 
layer of units might combine the results of the first layer to recognize patterns-
of-patterns; a third layer might combine the results of the second layer; and so 
on. 
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 141, at 9. For discussions of deep learning, see generally 
ALPAYDIN, supra note 111, at 104–09; KELLEHER, supra note 35; JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN 
TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 121–30 (2018); THIERRY POIBEAU, MACHINE TRANSLATION 181–95 
(2017). 
 164. As Ronald Yu and Gabriele Spina Alì observed: 
Deep learning machines can self-reprogram to the point that even their 
programmers are unable to understand the internal logic behind AI decisions. In 
this context, it is difficult to detect hidden biases and to ascertain whether they 
are caused by a fault in the computer algorithm or by flawed datasets. 
Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 105, at 5; see also Chander, supra note 96, at 1040 (“[I]n the era of 
self-enhancing algorithms, the algorithm’s human designers may not fully understand their own 
creation: even Google engineers may no longer understand what some of their algorithms do.”). 
Likewise, Joshua Kroll and his collaborators explained: 
Machine learning . . . is particularly ill-suited to source code analysis because it 
involves situations where the decisional rule itself emerges automatically from 
the specific data under analysis, sometimes in ways that no human can explain. 
In this case, source code alone teaches a reviewer very little, since the code only 
exposes the machine learning method used and not the data-driven decision rule. 
Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 638 (footnote omitted). 
 165. See DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 6 (“Learning algorithms—also known as learners—are 
algorithms that make other algorithms. With machine learning, computers write their own 
programs, so we don’t have to.”). 
 166. See Chander, supra note 96, at 1025 (“If we know that the results of an algorithm are 
systematically discriminatory, then we know enough to seek to . . . distrust its results.”). 
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the questionable products and services as well as for technology 
developers to come up with improvements.167 
To be sure, it can be cost-prohibitive to collect or disclose all 
algorithmic outcomes, not to mention the lack of incentives for 
technology developers to reveal the algorithms used or to make 
algorithmic outcomes available for public scrutiny.168 While intellectual 
property laws call into question the acceptability of demands to reveal 
source codes used to develop algorithms, privacy laws caution against the 
release of all algorithmic outcomes to the public.169 
As a compromise, technology developers could provide a 
representative, anonymized sample of the different algorithmic outcomes 
to enable the public to determine for itself the satisfactoriness of 
algorithm-enhanced technological products and services.170 This sample 
could be made available to the public or be provided to external 
auditors,171 ombudspersons,172 or oversight bodies.173 If privacy concerns 
 
 167. See id. (“If we know that the results of an algorithm are systematically discriminatory, 
then we know enough to seek to redesign the algorithm . . . .”). 
 168. See Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 105, at 6 (“Commercial providers could be reluctant to 
share information on their models or have their systems openly compared to their competitors.”). 
 169. See ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2 (Principle 5) (“[C]oncerns over privacy, 
protecting trade secrets, or revelation of analytics that might allow malicious actors to game the 
system can justify restricting access to qualified and authorized individuals.”); Pauline T. Kim, 
Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 191–92 (2017), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1212&context=penn_law_review
_online [https://perma.cc/4A9B-B2MC] (“[T]ransparency is often in tension with other important 
interests, such as protecting trade secrets, ensuring the privacy of sensitive personal information, 
and preventing strategic gaming of automated decision systems.”). 
 170. As Frank Pasquale declared: 
Just as the “fair use” doctrine has deterred the overpropertization of expression, 
generally recognized fair information practices should include large and 
powerful data holders’ obligation to surrender some sample of their data to 
entities entrusted to audit and assess the data holders’ activities. Objective audits 
will help restore confidence in automated authority. 
Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 235, 238–39 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
 171. See infra text accompanying notes 191–195 (discussing algorithmic audits and the need 
for institutional oversight). 
 172. See McGregor et al., supra note 151, at 332 (“Independent oversight bodies established 
to monitor State surveillance activity and analysis of their effectiveness may . . . provide points 
of reference and comparison. Other models being proposed include dedicated ombuds for the AI 
sector or the expansion of the mandate of existing ombuds to address these issues as well as 
industry regulatory bodies.” (footnote omitted)). 
 173. See INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 14, at 70 (“An independent, internationally 
coordinated body should be formed to oversee whether [autonomous and intelligent systems] 
actually meet ethical criteria, both when deployed, and considering their evolution after 
deployment and interaction with other products.”); Pasquale, supra note 170, at 247 (“[P]erhaps 
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are significant, these developers could instead offer algorithmic outcomes 
based on test data provided by consumer advocacy groups. The provision 
of these samples is important because they would support external audits 
even without providing access to the algorithms involved.174 
In recent years, commentators have also paid greater attention to the 
so-called right to explanation, especially when it relates to the new 
European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation.175 Although 
this right can be traced back to the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive,176 
 
a trusted advisory committee within the Federal Trade Commission could help courts and agencies 
adjudicate coming controversies over search engine practices.”); see also Katyal, supra note 157, 
at 1250–79 (calling for the controlled disclosure of source code); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, 
and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 
1419–20 (2018) (discussing the disclosure of source code under protective orders in the criminal 
setting). While disclosure to regulatory authorities makes great policy sense, governments 
increasingly push for provisions in bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements that ban 
laws requiring the disclosure or transfer of software source code. See, e.g., Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement art. 14.17.1, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/2UHR-LSQ5] (“No Party 
shall require the transfer of, or access to, source code of software owned by a person of another 
Party, as a condition for the import, distribution, sale or use of such software, or of products 
containing such software, in its territory.”). See also Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and 
Data Flows in Trade Agreements: The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65, 
115 (2017) (discussing this provision). 
 174. Rob Kitchin outlined six distinct ways to conduct research on algorithms: (1) 
“[e]xamining pseudo-code [or] source code”; (2) “[r]eflexively producing code”; (3) “[r]everse 
engineering”; (4) “[i]nterviewing designers or conducting an ethnography of a coding team”; (5) 
“[u]npacking the full socio-technical assemblage of algorithms”; and (6) “[e]xamining how 
algorithms do work in the world.” Rob Kitchin, Thinking Critically About and Researching 
Algorithms, 20 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 14, 22–26 (2017). 
 175. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 109, recital 71, at 14 (stating that the 
automated processing of personal data “should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should 
include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to 
express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such 
assessment and to challenge the decision”); id. art. 13.2(f), at 41 (requiring the data controller to 
provide to the data subject information about “the existence of automated decision-making, 
including profiling, . . . and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic 
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the 
data subject”); id. art. 14.2(g), at 42 (requiring the same). For discussions of what commentators 
have referred to as the right to explanation, see generally Isak Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The 
Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling, in EU INTERNET LAW: 
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 77 (Tatiani-Eleni Synodinou et al. eds., 2017); Lilian Edwards 
& Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm: Why a “Right to an Explanation” Is Probably Not the 
Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18 (2017); Margot E. Kaminski, The 
Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189 (2019); Andrew D. Selbst & Julia 
Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 233 
(2017); Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision 
Making and a “Right to Explanation,” AI MAG., Fall 2017, at 50. 
 176. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42 (EC) (“Member States 
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which preceded the new regulation,177 commentators have now devoted 
greater energy and effort to understanding this emerging right, due in 
large part to the increasing need to explain how data are being collected 
and used in technological platforms that are heavily driven by algorithms. 
In this age of artificial intelligence, the right to explanation is 
important not only because of the data used in the algorithms but also 
because of the algorithmic designs. Considering the not-too-distant future 
when algorithms will actively design new algorithms, building 
explainability into algorithmic designs as part of best practices or codes 
of conduct will likely be highly important.178 It is indeed no surprise that 
some commentators have emphasized the need to develop explainable 
algorithms, even though they acknowledge the continuous challenge of 
fully explaining the design and operation of algorithms.179 
For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has launched the 
Explainable AI (XAI) program that “aims to create a suite of machine 
learning techniques that [(1)] [p]roduce more explainable models, while 
maintaining a high level of learning performance (prediction accuracy); 
and [(2)] [e]nable human users to understand, appropriately trust, and 
effectively manage the emerging generation of artificially intelligent 
partners.”180 As a program manager at the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency Program explained: 
 
shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller . . . knowledge of the 
logic involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the 
automated decisions . . . .”); id. art. 15.1, at 43 (“Member States shall grant the right to every 
person not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly 
affects him and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain 
personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, 
conduct, etc.”). 
 177. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 20 (noting that a remedy similar to the right 
to explanation “had existed in the EU Data Protection Directive . . . which preceded the [General 
Data Protection Regulation], since 1995” (footnote omitted)). 
 178. See Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 105, at 7 (“[U]nderstanding AI internal logic is a first 
step towards ensuring full accountability for computational legal research and automated legal 
decisions.”). 
 179. See ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 1 (“Decisions made by predictive algorithms 
can be opaque because . . . []the algorithm may not lend itself to easy explanation[] . . . .”); 
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 141, at 9 (“Because trained models have a very large 
number of adjustable parameters—often hundreds of millions or more—training may yield a 
model that ‘works,’ in the sense of matching the data, but is not necessarily the simplest model 
that works.”); Noto La Diega, supra note 28, at 23 (suggesting that “a technical document which 
includes the algorithm used and the mere explanation of the logic in mathematical terms will not 
in itself meet the legal requirement [for the right to explanation]” and that this requirement “should 
be interpreted as the disclosure of the algorithm with an explanation in non-technical terms of the 
rationale of the decision and criteria relied upon”). 
 180. Matt Turek, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS 
AGENCY, https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/ 
8BPN-7N4K]. 
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New machine-learning systems will have the ability to 
explain their rationale, characterize their strengths and 
weaknesses, and convey an understanding of how they will 
behave in the future. The strategy for achieving that goal is 
to develop new or modified machine-learning techniques 
that will produce more explainable models. These models 
will be combined with state-of-the-art human-computer 
interface techniques capable of translating models into 
understandable and useful explanation dialogues for the end 
user . . . .181 
Likewise, private technology developers and research institutions 
have engaged in efforts to train intelligent machines to document their 
algorithms and internal logic. As Ronald Yu and Gabriele Spina Alì 
recounted: 
[A] team at Microsoft is trying to teach AI to show how it 
weighted every single variable in evaluating mortality risk 
factors. Similarly, a team at Rutgers University is working 
on a deep neural network that provides users with examples 
that demonstrates why it took a specific algorithmic 
decision. Another project at the University of Berkeley 
involves lashing two neural networks together, tasking one 
to describe the inner procedures running inside the other. 
Finally, an international team consisting, among the others, 
of researchers from Facebook, Berkeley and the University 
of Amsterdam has taught an image recognition software to 
show the evidence he relied upon to reach its decisions.182 
E.  Accountability 
As important as transparency is, it should not be equated with 
accountability.183 As political processes have repeatedly demonstrated, 
one could have a highly transparent process that involves checks and 
balances, different rounds of open consultations, and a large number of 
publicly available documents, yet the outcomes remain heavily captured 
by industries and are of limited public accountability.184 To address the 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 105, at 7 (footnotes omitted). 
 183. See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in 
Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 184 (2017) (“Normally, with human decision-
making, oversight is principally achieved through transparency—so much so that the terms 
‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ are often used interchangeably. In the realm of algorithmic 
enforcement, however, transparency alone is insufficient to generate accountability, for 
algorithms—due to their inherent traits—lack critical reflection.”). 
 184. See generally MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT MASQUERADE: HOW CORPORATE 
LOBBYING THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS (2013) (discussing how legislative capture by the 
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problems that the emerging and ever-widening algorithmic divide causes, 
transparency-based solutions should be separated from accountability-
based solutions. 
As noted earlier, civil rights and antidiscrimination laws already exist 
to ensure accountability.185 These laws will address the problems caused 
by those who have designed algorithms intentionally to facilitate 
individual deprivation or discrimination. Indeed, the need for public 
accountability in the artificial intelligence context is not that different 
from similar needs in other contexts, or in the offline world. Principle 3 
of the ACM Statement expressly states that “[i]nstitutions should be held 
responsible for decisions made by the algorithms that they use, even if it 
is not feasible to explain in detail how the algorithms produce their 
results.”186 That statement states further: “Policymakers should hold 
institutions using analytics to the same standards as institutions where 
humans have traditionally made decisions and developers should plan 
and architect analytical systems to adhere to those standards when 
algorithms are used to make automated decisions or as input to decisions 
made by people.”187 
In most situations, however, the discrimination or distortion originates 
in neutral or well-intentioned efforts. As a result, accountability will have 
to manifest in the form of remediation, rather than punishment. Such 
remediation-based accountability will require technology developers to 
quickly correct the problems once they have been notified of these 
problems188—similar, perhaps, to the “notice and takedown” 
 
copyright industries has undermined online freedom); BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN TELES, THE 
CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND 
INCREASE INEQUALITY 64–89 (2017) (discussing capture in the intellectual property area). 
 185. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 90, at 166 (“Antidiscrimination laws typically 
govern decisions on credit, housing, and employment, and restrict the use of categories such as 
race, gender, disability, or age.”); supra text accompanying notes 131–132. 
 186. ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2 (Principle 3); see INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, 
supra note 14, at 27 (proposing Principle 3 to “assure that designers, manufacturers, owners, and 
operators of [autonomous and intelligent systems] are responsible and accountable”); see also id. 
at 27–28 (providing recommendations under proposed Principle 3). 
 187. ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 1. 
 188. See id. at 2 (Principle 2) (“Regulators should encourage the adoption of mechanisms 
that enable questioning and redress for individuals and groups that are adversely affected by 
algorithmically informed decisions.”); Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98 (“Make available 
externally visible avenues of redress for adverse individual or societal effects of an algorithmic 
decision system, and designate an internal role for the person who is responsible for the timely 
remedy of such issues.”); see also Chander, supra note 96, at 1025 (“[I]f we believe that the real-
world facts, on which algorithms are trained and operate, are deeply suffused with invidious 
discrimination, then our prescription to the problem of racist or sexist algorithms is algorithmic 
affirmative action.” (footnote omitted)); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due 
Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 126–
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arrangements now found in copyright law.189 Indeed, as technology 
becomes increasingly complicated and inscrutable, ensuring quick 
correction of the problem will likely be more constructive than punishing 
those who have allowed the problems to surface in the first place, often 
unintentionally. 
It will also be important to provide institutional oversight of the design 
and use of algorithms that have far-reaching political, social, economic, 
and cultural impacts or that deeply affect the public interest.190 Such 
oversight—and the enforcement power with which it comes—is 
particularly urgent if problems have already been documented. 
Finally, it will be useful to require regular algorithmic audits to hold 
technology developers accountable.191 As Pauline Kim explained: 
 
27 (2014) (“Once notice is available, the question then becomes how one might challenge the 
fairness of the predictive process employed. We believe that the most robust mechanism for this 
is the opportunity to be heard and, if necessary, correct the record.”). 
 189. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2018) (requiring online service providers to “respond[] 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be 
the subject of infringing activity” once these providers have been notified of copyright 
infringement or obtained knowledge or awareness of such infringement); see also Peter K. Yu, 
Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 
709–13 (2010) (providing an overview of the “notice and takedown” procedure in copyright law). 
 190. See TREASURY BD. OF CAN. SECRETARIAT, RESPONSIBLE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 33 (2018) (Can.) (Version 2.0) (“[Potential] models of governance 
that could provide the necessary oversight and guidance to Federal institutions . . . can range from 
an ad hoc federal ‘Automation Advisory Board’ comprising of internal and external experts to a 
more formal and permanent body with staff.”); Katyal, supra note 2, at 109 (noting the need for 
“regulatory participation” to provide effective ethical safeguards); McGregor et al., supra note 
151, at 330–31 (“The establishment of internal monitoring and oversight bodies can play an 
important role in coordinating and overseeing the implementation of regular impact assessments 
and ensuring that findings are addressed.”); Katelyn Ringrose, Law Enforcement’s Pairing of 
Facial Recognition Technology with Body-Worn Cameras Escalates Privacy Concerns, 105 VA. 
L. REV. ONLINE 57, 66 (2019), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/ 
files/04.%20Final%20Ringrose.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CTV-Q2Z4] (underscoring the need to 
“establish independent oversight ensuring police accountability and mitigation of facial-
recognition misidentification errors likely to have a racially disparate impact”). 
 191. As the Center for Democracy and Technology noted on its website: 
Audits are one method to provide explanations and redress without 
compromising the intellectual property behind the business model. Designing 
algorithmic systems that can be easily audited increases accountability and 
provides a framework to standardize best practices across industries. While 
explanations can help individuals understand algorithmic decision making, 
audits are necessary for systemic and long-term detection of unfair outcomes. 
They also make it possible to fix problems when they arise. 
Digital Decisions, supra note 46; see also Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A 
Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37–42 (2017) (discussing ways to 
test and evaluate algorithms). But see Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 660–61 (discussing the limits 
to auditing in the algorithmic context). 
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When the goal is nondiscrimination, auditing could involve 
techniques to ensure that an algorithm follows a specified 
rule—for example, sorting must not occur based on race or 
sex. Alternatively, auditing for discrimination could take the 
form of examining inputs and outputs to detect when a 
decision process systematically disadvantages particular 
groups. The latter form of auditing does not involve direct 
examination of the decision process, but is useful in 
detecting patterns.192 
Principle 6 of the ACM Statement specifically requires that “[m]odels, 
algorithms, data, and decisions be recorded so that they can be audited in 
cases where harm is suspected.”193 Principle 7 further states: “Institutions 
should use rigorous methods to validate their models and document those 
methods and results. In particular, they should routinely perform tests to 
assess and determine whether the model generates discriminatory harm. 
Institutions are encouraged to make the results of such tests public.”194 
Although algorithmic audits can be done internally, it is often 
important for government regulators, ombudspersons, or outside auditors 
to independently review the algorithms and data used.195 Indeed, past 
experience has shown that outsiders are sufficiently motivated and well 
equipped196 to find bugs and other vulnerabilities in computer programs 
 
 192. Kim, supra note 169, at 190. 
 193. ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2 (Principle 6); see also INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, 
supra note 14, at 53 (“To maximize effective evaluation by third parties (e.g., regulators, accident 
investigators), [autonomous and intelligent systems] should be designed, specified, and 
documented so as to permit the use of strong verification and validation techniques for assessing 
the system’s safety and norm compliance . . . .”); Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98 (“Identify, 
log, and articulate sources of error and uncertainty throughout the algorithm and its data sources 
so that expected and worst case implications can be understood and inform mitigation 
procedures.”); Digital Decisions, supra note 46 (“An effective audit requires institutions to 
maintain internal documentation of the logic or circumstance behind significant design choices 
and procedures governing who is responsible for making changes. These systems are best installed 
as a product develops, rather than retroactively.”). 
 194. ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2 (Principle 7). 
 195. See id. (Principle 5) (“Public scrutiny of the data provides maximum opportunity for 
corrections.”); Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98, at 2 (“Enable interested third parties to probe, 
understand, and review the behavior of the algorithm through disclosure of information that 
enables monitoring, checking, or criticism, including through provision of detailed 
documentation, technically suitable [application programming interfaces], and permissive terms 
of use.”); see also MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 75, at 180–82 (discussing the 
need for external and internal algorithmists); Annie Lee, Note, Algorithmic Auditing and 
Competition Under the CFAA: The Revocation Paradigm of Interpreting Access and 
Authorization, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1307, 1309–10 (2018) (“Algorithmic auditors largely 
consist of academics, computer scientists from nonprofits, and journalists who scrutinize online 
websites powered by algorithms for bias and discrimination.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 196. Some users will no doubt discover these bugs and vulnerabilities by accident. 
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or systems.197 To provide support for external audits that do not involve 
regulatory authorities, adjustments will have to be made to those laws that 
have posed barriers to external reviews of source code and computer 
systems,198 such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act199 and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.200 
F.  Competition 
Competition is imperative if society is to develop more efficient, more 
effective, and less biased algorithms.201 Such competition is particularly 
needed when algorithmic choices are increasingly difficult, or time 
 
 197. See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 
13, 24 (2006) (discussing SunnComm’s threat to sue a computer science graduate student who 
figured out on his own how to disarm its copy-protection technology by pushing the shift key 
when loading a CD into a computer); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. 
Supp. 2d 294, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving a Norwegian teenager who cowrote the DeCSS 
program that circumvented the copy-protection technology used by the U.S. motion picture 
industry), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 198. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2018)), 
for example, provides a limited exception for encryption research. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g). This 
exception, however, has been criticized for failing to support such research. See Joseph P. Liu, 
The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 503 (2003) 
(“[E]ven though academic encryption researchers can continue to conduct and publish some of 
their research under the DMCA without significant practical risk of criminal or civil liability, the 
DMCA significantly affects the manner in which that research is conducted.”); Pamela 
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention 
Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 524 (1999) (arguing that the 
DMCA “should be amended to provide a general purpose ‘or other legitimate purposes’ provision 
to avert judicial contortions in interpreting the statute”); Peter K. Yu, Is Anti-Piracy Law Stifling 
Cybersecurity Innovation?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at 20 (discussing how the DMCA has 
undermined cryptography and cybersecurity). 
 199. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018). As Sonia Katyal observed: 
[T]he ACLU sued on behalf of four researchers who maintained that [this statute] 
actually prevented them from scraping data from sites, or from creating fake 
profiles to investigate whether algorithmic discrimination led some employment 
and real estate sites to fail to display certain listings on the basis of race or gender. 
The concern was that the law permitted researchers to be held criminally 
accountable because the research might involve violating one of the sites’ Terms 
of Service, something that could carry both prison and fines. As one researcher 
observed, these laws have the perverse effect of “protecting data-driven 
commercial systems from even the most basic external analysis.” 
Katyal, supra note 2, at 122 (footnotes omitted); see also Lee, supra note 195, at 1311–38 
(discussing how the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has discouraged algorithmic auditors from 
exposing questionable business practices and has fostered a hostile market for legitimate 
competitors). 
 200. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860. 
 201. See Lee, supra note 195, at 1310 (“Online competitors . . . promote fair online practices 
by providing users with a choice between competitive products . . . .”). 
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consuming, to explain.202 Indeed, without competition, it would be hard 
to identify problems within an algorithm or to determine whether that 
algorithm has provided the best solution in light of the existing 
technological conditions and constraints. Moreover, because a wide 
variety of algorithms exist to achieve the same goal, competition will be 
greatly needed to accommodate the different trade-offs preferred by 
either algorithm designers or consumers.203 
In the past decade, commentators have already explained why 
competition is badly needed in a data-pervasive world, the Internet of 
Things, and the Fourth Industrial Revolution.204 In the artificial 
intelligence context, for instance, commentators have examined the 
challenge of using antitrust or competition law to foster competition 
among the dominant players.205 In the past few years, European 
competition authorities have also actively explored ways to address the 
 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 162–165 (noting the growing challenges to 
explaining algorithms in the artificial intelligence context). 
 203. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 103, at 189 (“There is often no single right answer to 
the question of which is the best AI strategy or the best set of AI tools, because AIs involve trade-
offs: more speed, less accuracy; more autonomy, less control; more data, less privacy.”). 
 204. As Timo Minssen and Justin Pierce observed: 
While there are issues to be resolved between Big Data and [intellectual 
property rights], there is a growing awareness of the importance of data and 
specifically Big Data by market authorities. Antitrust agencies, those in the 
United States and competition agencies in Europe, are taking note of Big Data, 
and there is an increasing trend to examine closely the collection, use, and access 
of Big Data for anticompetitive effects. 
Timo Minssen & Justin Pierce, Big Data and Intellectual Property Rights in the Health and Life 
Sciences, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 311, 320 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018); 
see also MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 75, at 182–84 (discussing the use of 
competition law to govern the data barons); Josef Drexl, Designing Competitive Markets for 
Industrial Data—Between Propertisation and Access, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & 
ELECTRONIC COM. L. 257, 280–85 (2017) (discussing the application of EU competition law to 
address refusals to grant access to data); Peter K. Yu, Data Producer’s Right and the Protection 
of Machine-Generated Data, 93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 927 (2019) (noting that competition law is “a 
critical area relating to data governance”). 
 205. See generally Rupprecht Podszun & Stefan Kreifels, Data and Competition Law, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN DATA SCIENCE AND LAW 183 (Vanessa Mak et al. eds., 2018) (discussing 
the uneasy relationship between data and competition law); Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, 
Antitrust, Algorithmic Pricing and Tacit Collusion, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 40, at 624, 628–32 (discussing the complications regarding 
algorithmic tacit collusion); Clark D. Asay, Artificial Stupidity, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 51–53), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399170 [https://perma.cc 
/F7TR-Y4N6] (discussing the pros and cons of using antitrust to thwart consolidation in the 
artificial intelligence industry); Maurice E. Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About Data-
opolies?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 275 (2018) (discussing “data-opolies” in the antitrust context and 
the harm they cause). 
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anticompetitive effects generated by U.S. technology giants, such as 
Google and Facebook.206 
The issues relating to competition are complicated because big-data 
analytics require the existence of large, comprehensive datasets.207 The 
more competition there is, the more fragmentary datasets will become, 
and the less likely that the full potential of artificial intelligence will be 
realized. Nevertheless, policy makers and commentators have 
increasingly looked for laws, policies, and institutional mechanisms to 
facilitate data sharing, portability, and interoperability.208 After all, the 
better coordinated the data usage is, the more benefits algorithmic 
competition will provide. Greater competition in this area will also make 
it easier to identify problems in algorithms, especially those utilizing 
identical or substantially identical training and feedback data.209 
 
 206. See Stucke, supra note 205, at 275–77 (discussing the actions taken by the European 
competition authorities against Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon); see also Peter K. Yu & 
John Cross, Why Are the Europeans Going After Google?, NEWSWEEK (May 18, 2015, 2:31 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/why-are-europeans-going-after-google-332775 [https://perma.cc/ 
MB8M-8m69] (discussing the EU antitrust probe of Google). 
 207. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 75, at 30 (“[B]ig data relies on all the 
information, or at least as much as possible . . . .”). 
 208. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 109, art. 20, at 45 (introducing the right 
to data portability); see also MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 75, at 183 (“We should 
enable data transactions, such as through licensing and interoperability.”); Drexl, supra note 204, 
at 292 (“The functioning of the data economy will also depend on the interoperability of digital 
formats and the tools of data collecting and processing.”); Wolfgang Kerber, A New (Intellectual) 
Property Right for Non-Personal Data? An Economic Analysis, 65 GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR INT] 989, 997 (2016) (Ger.) 
(“[S]upporting portability, interoperability and standardization in regard to data is seen as pivotal 
policy measures for improving the governance of data in the digital economy.”); Yu, supra note 
204, at 889 (“[I]f we are to maximize our ability to undertake big data analyses, such analyses 
may require greater sharing of data—which, in turn, calls for greater data portability and 
interoperability.”). 
 209. As Professor Kitchin suggested: 
[R]esearchers might search Google using the same terms on multiple computers 
in multiple jurisdictions to get a sense of how its PageRank algorithm is 
constructed and works in practice, or they might experiment with posting and 
interacting with posts on Facebook to try and determine how its EdgeRank 
algorithm positions and prioritises posts in user time lines, or they might use 
proxy servers and feed dummy user profiles into e-commerce systems to see how 
prices might vary across users and locales. 
Kitchin, supra note 174, at 24 (citations omitted); see also Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 105, at 7 
(calling on legal researchers to “compare outputs from different programs to detect flaws in the 
AI utilized and increase research accuracy”). 
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G.  Perspective 
If society is to truly understand how the remedial actions proposed in 
this Article can properly address the emerging and ever-widening 
algorithmic divide, it needs to have realistic goals. As appealing as it is 
to foster equality in the age of artificial intelligence, society should 
recognize that such equality takes time to achieve, if achievable at all. 
Indeed, much of the inequality perpetuated by algorithms and intelligent 
machines may be historical and may therefore have limited relation to 
algorithmic designs and data practices. If so, the solution to the problem 
lies elsewhere. 
Two decades ago, when policy makers were actively searching for 
ways to bridge the digital divide, commentators reminded us of the 
importance of focusing on relative, as opposed to absolute, inequality in 
the information society.210 In her widely cited book on the digital divide, 
Pippa Norris observed: 
Despite the more exaggerated hopes of some cyber-
optimists, the Internet is not going to suddenly eradicate the 
fundamental and intractable problems of disease, debt, and 
disadvantage facing developing countries. The more 
interesting question, with important implications for 
understanding the new media, concerns the relative 
inequality of opportunities. Is it easier or more difficult to go 
online in different societies, compared with inequalities of 
access to other types of communication technologies, such 
as telephones and televisions?211 
Considering that the real world is far from equal, inequality will always 
find its way to the technological environment. Having a more realistic 
perspective will certainly be conducive to developing workable solutions 
to help bridge the algorithmic divide. 
After all, the extent of this divide may have been influenced by the 
existence of other divides, such as those relating to disparities in power, 
wealth, or education.212 As Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky rightly 
 
 210. See NORRIS, supra note 13, at 49–54 (discussing relative inequalities in the information 
society); VAN DIJK, supra note 13, at 4 (“[One] misunderstanding might be the impression that the 
[digital] divide is about absolute inequalities, such as between those included and those excluded. 
In reality, most inequalities of access to digital technology are of a more relative kind.”); Tene & 
Polonetsky, supra note 90, at 164 (“[T]o avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater, critics 
should compare the consequences of algorithmic decisions to the prevailing status quo.”). 
 211. NORRIS, supra note 13, at 49. 
 212. See High-level Panel Report, supra note 32, at 6 (“Many existing inequalities—in 
wealth, opportunity, education, and health—are being widened further [by the digital divide].”); 
INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 6, at v (“AI may widen gaps between countries, reinforcing 
the current digital divide. Countries may need different strategies and responses because AI 
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observed, “In many cases, criticisms of algorithmic decisions in fact 
reflect broader concerns about a digital divide or even a general 
condemnation of an unequal society.”213 One of the authors’ illustrations 
concerns the Boston-based Street Bump app, which uses Global 
Positioning System coordinates and motion-sensing capabilities in 
smartphones to automatically report potholes to municipal authorities.214 
While innovative and socially beneficial, that app has been criticized for 
reporting more potholes in wealthy neighborhoods than poorer areas, due 
in large part to the higher concentration of smartphone usage in the 
reported neighborhoods.215 Anticipating these and other similar 
complications, well-meaning governmental authorities frequently 
struggle with the difficult dilemma concerning whether to introduce new 
technological solutions that would address urban problems but at the 
 
adoption levels vary.” (footnote omitted)); VAN DIJK, supra note 13, at 6 (“[Digital d]ivides are 
byproducts of old inequalities, digital technology is intensifying inequalities, and new inequalities 
are appearing.”); see also Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, 
NATURE (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.nature.com/news/there-is-a-blind-spot-in-ai-research-
1.20805 [https://perma.cc/MGQ4-H2MQ] (“[I]n some current contexts, the downsides of AI 
systems disproportionately affect groups that are already disadvantaged by factors such as race, 
gender and socio-economic background.”). The converse is also true: bridging the digital divide 
could help cabin or reduce other divides. See Yu, supra note 7, at 35 (“[S]olutions to the digital 
divide and other, more traditional divides can work together to reinforce each other.”). 
 213. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 90, at 137. 
 214. As the authors described: 
In 2013, Boston adopted an innovative solution to combat the common 
municipal problem of road potholes. The city introduced “Street Bump,” an app 
using the motion-sensing capabilities of smartphones to automatically report 
information to [the] municipal government about the condition of the streets 
users drive on. When a user’s car hit a pothole, their phone recorded the shock 
and sent it to a data hub, which combined the information from many other 
phones to pinpoint problem areas on streets to be repaired. 
Id. at 158. 
 215. As the authors explained: 
Despite being presented as evidence for the risks of algorithmic decision-
making, the Boston Street Bump app had little to do with data-driven 
discrimination. If the app were programmed to apportion greater weight to 
reports coming from wealthier neighborhoods than poorer ones, for example, 
critics could rightly blame it for class-based discrimination. But that was not the 
case with Street Bump, which simply created a seamless way to report and help 
fix a common urban flaw. In this case, where a higher density of smartphone 
users in wealthier neighborhoods created the concentration of reports, critics 
were not really faulting the app but rather the city’s socio-economic fabric. Like 
many large American cities, Boston has racial, ethnic, and socio-economic fault 
lines, which transcend ownership and use of smartphones and apps. 
Id. at 159. 
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same time perpetuate existing inequities. Reflecting on this dilemma, the 
authors asked: 
Should cities avoid deploying new apps just because they 
help part, but not all, of their population? And against which 
backdrop should municipal leaders assess Street Bump’s 
disparate impact? Perhaps the previous pothole reporting 
system—mailing complaints through the post or calling 
them in on the phone—was unbalanced as well? More 
generally, in an unequal society, every time an institution 
acts to improve a system, improving life for some citizens, it 
can be criticized for increasing—or at least not 
diminishing—existing disparities with persons who are 
worse off. Does that imply that until all disparities are 
purged urban systems should not improve?216 
These questions are important, because the overarching goal of efforts to 
bridge the algorithmic divide is not to close the divide—an arguably 
impossible feat—but to expand access to machine learning and artificial 
intelligence to those who would otherwise be disenfranchised.217 
Finally, as rhetorically attractive as the term “algorithmic divide” may 
have been, one should recall the fact that emphasizing a binary divide 
often blurs the distinction between the different levels of algorithmic 
inclusion based on age, gender, ethnicity, income, education, geography, 
and many other variables. To some extent, the term “algorithmic divide” 
faces the same problem as the term “digital divide,” which implies “a 
bipolar societal split.”218 As Mark Warschauer observed with respect to 
the latter: 
[T]here is not a binary division between information haves 
and have-nots, but rather a gradation based on different 
degrees of access to information technology. Compare, for 
example, a professor at UCLA with a high-speed connection 
in her office, a student in Seoul who occasionally uses a 
cyber cafè, and a rural activist in Indonesia who has no 
computer or phone line but whose colleagues in the 
nongovernmental organization . . . with whom she is 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. Cf. WARSCHAUER, supra note 18, at 211 (“The overall policy challenge is not to 
overcome a digital divide but rather to expand access to and use of ICT for promoting social 
inclusion.”). 
 218. Id. at 6; see also RAGNEDDA, supra note 18, at 55 (“[T]he digital divide indicates not a 
gap in terms of a binary division, but rather a continuum based on different degrees of possession 
and level of use of technologies of information.”); VAN DIJK, supra note 16, at 3 (“If any 
delineation is required, a tripartite society might be a better definition than a two-tiered one. At 
one extreme we perceive an information elite and at the other the digitally illiterate or the fully 
excluded. In between are the majority of the population, having access in one way or another and 
using digital technology to a certain extent.” (citation omitted)). 
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working download and print out information for her. This 
example illustrates just three degrees of possible access a 
person can have to online material.219 
Likewise, Henry Jenkins declared: “The rhetoric of the digital divide 
holds open this division between civilized tool-users and uncivilized 
nonusers. As well-meaning as it is as a policy initiative, it can be 
marginalizing and patronizing in its own terms.”220 
To make things even more complicated, an individual can be on one 
side of the digital divide based on select categories but on the other side 
based on other categories. As Jan van Dijk observed: 
Take, for instance, a relatively poor, young, single, female, 
Jamaican teacher living in the United Kingdom. Her 
inclusion in the categories of educational workers, young 
people, and inhabitants of a developed country would put her 
on the “right” side of the digital divide . . . . However, being 
a female with relatively low income, perhaps living alone 
without a partner or children to share a computer or Internet 
connection, and being part of an ethnic minority means that 
she would most likely be on the “wrong” side of the 
divide.221 
In sum, society needs to keep its perspective in check when 
developing solutions to bridge the algorithmic divide. Like the digital 
divide, the algorithmic divide has many dimensions and covers many 
different areas. Neither an emphasis on absolute equality nor a focus on 
the binary split will help society develop the laws, policies, and 
institutional mechanisms needed to address such a critical challenge in 
the age of artificial intelligence. 
CONCLUSION 
The emerging and ever-widening algorithmic divide has threatened to 
take away the many political, economic, social, cultural, educational, and 
career opportunities that machine learning and artificial intelligence have 
provided to a large segment of the population—whether national or 
global. While this divide is only at the emerging stage, it is quickly 
widening,222 just like how the digital divide started two decades ago with 
 
 219. WARSCHAUER, supra note 18, at 6–7. 
 220. Jeffrey R. Young, Does “Digital Divide” Rhetoric Do More Harm than Good?, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 9, 2001), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Does-Digital-Divide-Rhetoric/ 
3058 [https://perma.cc/9X67-ZCQ9], cited in WARSCHAUER, supra note 18, at 7. 
 221. VAN DIJK, supra note 13, at 13. 
 222. To make tracking the algorithmic divide more difficult, algorithms evolve over time. 
See Kitchin, supra note 174, at 16 (“What constitutes an algorithm has changed over time and 
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a focus on the lack of access to information technology before quickly 
expanding to encompass the lack of access to digital content and skills.223 
This Article takes stock of this algorithmic divide and the three 
problems that the divide has precipitated: algorithmic deprivation, 
algorithmic discrimination, and algorithmic distortion. To fashion a 
holistic response to these problems, the Article utilizes a 
multidisciplinary approach and proposes seven clusters of remedial 
actions. While these actions are by no means exhaustive, they provide 
useful starting points for policy makers and commentators to start 
thinking about how laws, policies, institutions, and business practices can 
be harnessed to bridge the algorithmic divide. By proposing these actions, 
this Article aims to foster greater equality in the age of artificial 
intelligence. 
 
they can be thought about in a number of ways: technically, computationally, mathematically, 
politically, culturally, economically, contextually, materially, philosophically, ethically and so 
on.”). 
 223. See RAGNEDDA, supra note 18, at 4–5 (discussing the evolution of the three levels of 
the digital divide); Yu, supra note 7, at 29–32 (noting the ever-changing definition of the digital 
divide); see also Mira Burri, Re-Conceptualizing the Global Digital Divide, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. 
INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 217, 219–21 (2011) (discussing the digital divide as impeded 
access to content). 
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